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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to assess the unique technical and policy-based cybersecurity challenges
facing Canada’s critical infrastructure environment and to analyze how current government and
industry practices are not equipped to remediate or offset associated strategic risks to the
country. Further, the thesis also provides cases and evidence demonstrating that Canada’s critical
infrastructure has been specifically targeted by foreign and domestic cyber threat actors to
pressure the country’s economic, safety and national security interests. Essential services that
Canadians and Canadian businesses rely on daily are intricately linked to the availability and
integrity of vital infrastructure sectors, such as the financial, water, healthcare, electricity, and
transportation systems. These sectors continue to become increasingly connected to Information
Technology (IT) assets and processes that are vulnerable to malicious computer activity. To
assess these vulnerabilities, the technical components of this paper analyze the current
cybersecurity challenges impacting critical infrastructure owners, operators, regulators and
vendors with regard to legacy IT systems and new emerging technologies—such as cloud
computing and 5G. This includes analysis on the integration of corporate Internet-linked
networks with traditionally isolated Industrial Control System (ICS) and Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks. It also includes a non-industrial sector case study
focusing on the financial system, which discusses the cybersecurity challenges facing the
national Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS). From a national security perspective, the thesis
maps Canada’s cyber threat landscape and analyzes actors such as nation-state governments,
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, terrorist organizations, malicious and negligent
insiders, and hacktivists. As a recommendation, the thesis constructs a three-tiered public-private
partnership that draws on a new Canadian-based cybersecurity assessment framework, the
adoption of an Assumption of Compromise (AoC) security culture, and the improvement of
cyber threat information-sharing programs.
KEYWORDS: cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, national security, SCADA, ICS, Public
Safety Canada, cyber attack, control networks, corporate networks, NIST framework
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INTRODUCTION

Canada’s economic stability and national security depend on resilient critical
infrastructure, such as secure and reliable access to banking, healthcare, communications, food
distribution and transportation systems. The safe and uninterrupted operation of this
infrastructure is a strategic imperative for the government, and any actor aiming to disrupt these
operations poses a real and immediate risk to the safety and prosperity of the country. Previous
cybersecurity incidents involving essential services and infrastructure have demonstrated the
social and financial costs information system disruptions can induce. To ensure Canadian
citizens, businesses and organizations are protected from the strategic consequences such a
disruption could yield, the federal government must continue to expand and evolve their
activities aiming to improve the country’s national cyber resiliency in the essential service and
infrastructure space.
In May of 2017, Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) experienced the WannaCry
ransomware worm—developed and executed by North Korean threat actors—which resulted in
the cancellation of at least 19,494 healthcare appointments and the delay of 139 urgent cancer
treatments nationwide.1 More than 1,200 pieces of diagnostic equipment were inflected,
including MRI scanners and devices for testing blood and tissue samples. In December of 2015,
a highly complex and calculated cyber attack against Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure resulted
in power outages lasting six hours, impacting 225,000 citizens and regional businesses.2 In

1
Owen Hughes, “WannaCry Impact On NHS Considerably Larger Than Previously Suggested,” Digital
Health: News, Networks and Intelligence, October 21, 2017,
https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html.
2
Dustin Volz, “U.S. Government Concludes Cyber Attack Caused Ukraine Power Outage,” Reuters, February
25, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity/u-s-government-concludes-cyber-attack-causedukraine-power-outage-idUSKCN0VY30K.
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January of 2019, a zero-day vulnerability resulted in a computer virus disabling critical
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure based in the Health Sciences North (HSN) facility,
located in Ontario, Canada. The incident at HSN, who provides IT services for other regional
medical centers, forced 24 hospitals throughout Northern Ontario to experience sustained critical
service disruptions.3 These disruptions included electronic medical records system downtime at
21 hospitals, cancer program downtime at 12 hospitals, medical imaging system downtime at 10
hospitals and back-office software and email service downtime at four hospitals.4 These are a
few examples of the real impact and cost malicious cyber actors and poor IT security and risk
management practices can induce to services Canadian citizens, businesses and organizations
rely on 365 days a year.
Rapid evolutions in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) environment
continue to alter the control systems, operating procedures and risks associated with the
country’s essential services and critical infrastructure environment. Included in this evolution are
the introduction of 5th Generation wireless networks (5G) and the application of Internet of
Things (IoT) devices nationwide, which will vastly increase the amount and types of
connectivity experienced across the country in addition to increasing the reliance on remote
operation over geographically dispersed assets. As connectivity grows so will the attack surface
for malicious cyber actors, which invariably raises the prospect of a successful operation or
damaging incident. Not only are new processes of digital interaction creating vulnerabilities, but
the actual tools used to manage the changing ICT landscape are also posing new challenges. For
example, Software-defined Networking (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) are
3

Carly Weeks, “Computer Virus Causes Delays At Dozens Of Northern Ontario Hospitals,” The Globe and
Mail, January 18, 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-computer-virus-causes-delays-at-dozensof-northern-ontario-hospitals/.
4
CBC News, “Virus Affecting IT System At Health Sciences North Impacting Health Care Across The
Region,” CBC, January 17, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/hsn-it-virus-update-1.4982267.
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altering the architecture of the country’s telecommunication backbone, creating new
cybersecurity risks that traditional monitoring and protection policies will fail to address. Since
the reliability and integrity of the ICT environment is universally important to all critical
infrastructure sectors in Canada, these specific technological changes represent one example that
will lead to cross-sector risks impacting multiple industries and essential services
simultaneously. Further, as global supply chains continue to grow, so will the risk of embedded
malware or maliciously altered software and hardware being acquired by important Canadian
infrastructure operators and their systems.
To address the changing cyber threat landscape, the federal government and its agencies
have begun to review cybersecurity policy and implement new risk, control and management
standards. For example, Public Safety Canada’s use of the Canadian Cyber Resilience Review
(CCRR) and the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Tool (CIRT) reflect proactive measures being
undertaken to increase cybersecurity in the essential services ecosystem. Additional government
publications reinforce this effort, such as Public Safety Canada’s 2016 “Fundamentals of Cyber
Security for Canada’s Critical Infrastructure Community” and the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security’s 2018 “National Cyber Threat Assessment.”5 However, more awareness, mapping,
audit and security control development needs to occur to properly respond to the rapidly
evolving IT risks within the critical infrastructure space. This particularly includes third-party
vendors and new unique challenges posed by advanced and dedicated threat actors.
Since the majority of Canadian critical infrastructure is operated and owned by the
private sector, there is a large and complex non-governmental vendor system providing daily

5

“Cyber Security: Publications And Reports,” Public Safety Canada, last modified November 19, 2018,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cbr-scrt/index-en.aspx.
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maintenance and support services across the country’s key industries.6 These commercial
enterprises and their subcontractors interact with both public and other private entities to ensure
timely, consistent and safe delivery of essential services to Canadians. Critical infrastructure
stakeholders have historically overlooked detailed and tested cybersecurity policies as an attempt
to reduce any barriers to communication, business efficiency or sensory reading speed—
specifically in industrial control environments. This approach attracted hardware equipment and
software optimized for an environment focused on operational efficiency and uptime, which has
led to a digitally networked and Internet-linked Canadian infrastructure lacking key security
controls. Similar risks have emerged in non-industrial sectors, though the technical challenges
vary in scope and function. Foreign intelligence agencies, hacktivists, cyber criminals and
terrorist organizations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and determined to infiltrate these
types of industrial and non-industrial networks, which poses an active strategic threat to the most
important systems Canadians depend on daily. Therefore, if Canada fails to address cyber
vulnerabilities throughout its critical infrastructure environment, the prospect of a malicious
actor or a catastrophic IT accident disrupting an essential service to the country will continue to
increase.

Thesis Objective and Statement
The aim of this thesis is to assess the unique technical and policy-based cybersecurity
challenges impacting Canada’s critical infrastructure environment and how current private
industry and government policies are not sufficiently equipped or implemented to address these
growing strategic threats. Further, the thesis will also provide evidence highlighting that

6

“Fundamentals Of Cyber Security For Canada's CI Community,” Public Safety Canada, June 24, 2016,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-fndmntls-cybr-scrty-cmmnty/index-en.aspx.
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Canada’s critical infrastructure faces a distinctive cyber threat landscape, including a range of
actors who have demonstrated intent and capability to infiltrate nationally important IT systems
to pressure the country’s economic and security interests. To mitigate these new cyber-based
challenges threatening the country’s long-term safety, security and financial wellbeing, this
thesis will advocate for a new three-tiered critical infrastructure cybersecurity strategy
implemented and regulated by a coordinated public-private partnership.
First, the government should create an appropriate minimum cybersecurity standard for
any operator, vendor or company—and their hardware and software products—supporting the
critical infrastructure system. Using a framework as an assessment tool, these standards would
leverage control-based cybersecurity practices and include mandatory risk assessments of
services to be provided from third parties. It would also audit and test vendors and operators to
ensure their information security posture and products are adequately prepared to address
Canada’s threat landscape. Second, government and private sector stakeholders operating or
servicing critical infrastructure must develop an assumption of compromise (AoC) culture to
proactively defend their network from breach. These principles will ensure Canadian critical
infrastructure maintains a layered defense against a range of cyber threats—malicious,
environmental and accidental—while constantly searching for indicators of compromise and
threats already within the networks. Third, the federal government needs to leverage Canadian
intelligence, industry and cybersecurity bodies, such as the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Cyber Threat Exchange (CCTX), to improve the
provision of real-time threat data to critical infrastructure operators and vendors. This tier allows
intelligence to be disseminated throughout the critical infrastructure apparatus, so cybersecurity

5

policies, practices and tooling can be tailored to defend against new exploit techniques and kits, a
specific threat actor or a newly discovered zero-day vulnerability.

Roadmap
The first chapter of the thesis will provide an overview of the composition and
governance arrangements associated with Canadian critical infrastructure, particularly
emphasizing the pervasiveness of private industry servicing, operating or owning essential IT
and physical assets.
The second chapter will highlight and explain the primary technical risks that Canada’s
industrial and non-industrial infrastructure sectors are currently experiencing, highlighting the
existence of exploitable vulnerabilities in some of the country’s most important IT systems and
processes. This chapter includes an in-depth case study reviewing cybersecurity challenges
throughout core elements of the country’s financial market infrastructure.
The third chapter builds off of the technical analysis in chapter two and outlines how the
linking of legacy IT systems with emerging technologies will create new risks and vulnerabilities
for Canadians and Canadian businesses dependent on the availability of essential infrastructure
services. Key technologies assessed in this section include IoT devices, 5G and cloud computing.
The fourth chapter maps and assesses Canada’s critical infrastructure cyber threat
landscape by providing evidence of nation-state governments, foreign intelligence agencies,
insider threats, hacktivists and terrorist organizations seeking to disrupt, degrade and infiltrate
nationally important IT systems. This chapter also analyzes motives, capabilities and the level of
risk associated with the different threat actors.

6

The fifth chapter examines the policy and technical features of three past cyber attacks on
critical infrastructure that resulted in catastrophic physical or financial damage. These strategic
attacks are analyzed and then contextualized to gauge the possible impact an attack on the same
or greater scale could have across Canada. The attacks assessed in this section include the
Ukraine electrical grid shutdown in 2015, the Stuxnet computer worm in 2010, and the
WannaCry Ransomware Virus in the context of Britain’s Healthcare System in 2017.
The sixth and final chapter constructs and describes a three-tiered public-private
cybersecurity recommendation capable of mitigating both technical and policy shortcomings
currently residing across Canada’s industrial and non-industrial critical infrastructure
environments. This chapter leverages the threat actor risk analysis, the technical breakdown of
current vulnerabilities and the mapping of relevant stakeholders in previous chapters to identify
where policy reform could be beneficial and how it will address the strategic threat of critical
infrastructure cyber risk.

7

ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

It is important to define a common understanding of critical infrastructure to be able to
recognize its importance and role in supporting the prosperity of Canada. A report developed in
March of 2014 by the Governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom
(U.K), and the United States (U.S.) outlined each country’s approach and definition of critical
infrastructure. According to the Canadian Government, critical infrastructure refers to,
“Processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health,
safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of the
government.”7 A previous 2011 Public Safety report, titled “National Strategy for Critical
Infrastructure,” highlighted that, “Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in
catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects, and significant harm to public confidence.”8
Although these reports do not specifically or thoroughly address current cybersecurity concerns,
the documents do highlight the intrinsic relationship between a country’s national security and
the integrity and availability of its essential services and infrastructure.
The key purpose of this chapter is to highlight the types of industries and sectors this
thesis will be referring to when commenting on critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
Additionally, it is important to outline the governance and oversight models that preside over the
country’s infrastructure and associated services to understand how ongoing and future
cybersecurity initiatives will be administered, funded, controlled and implemented.

7

“Forging A Common Understanding For Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada, March 19, 2014,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-frgng-cmmn-ndrstndng-crtcalnfrstrctr/index-en.aspx.
8
“National Strategy For Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada, November 11, 2011,
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx.
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Sector Identification and Overview
The Canadian Government recognizes 10 Critical Infrastructure sectors, which include:
Energy and Utilities; Finance; Food; Transportation; Government; Information and
Communication Technology; Health; Water; Safety; and Manufacturing.9 Although each of these
sectors has different control regimes that govern operations and standards, the federal
government has identified unique features within these categories that indicate an active and
essential role in supporting the daily lives of Canadian citizens, businesses and organizations. It
is also important to note that no individual sector is entirely independent, as there are
interconnected and interdependent relationships. For example, the financial sector, while having
its own internal ICT technologies, policies and oversight programs, does routinely rely on the
accessibility and operability of the national public payments system and its associated
communications backbone. Another example of cross-sector dependence would be the
relationship between water and wastewater management systems and the food supply chain.
Irrigation processes, water filtration systems and pumping stations all contribute an essential
service supporting Canada’s agricultural base and food security.
To address the cross-sector complexities that emerge from interdependences and
overlaying functions, Defense Research and Development Canada created the “National Critical
Infrastructure Interdependency Model” in 2016.10 This workshop, which eventually became a
government publication, reveals the intricacies between multi-sector relationships, such as fuel
shortages hindering ambulatory emergency response and the operation of the country’s safety
infrastructure. This could result in mobility and transport issues for patients needing access to
hospitals, forcing medical facilities to deliver services externally and potentially straining local
9

“National Strategy For Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada.
“National Critical Infrastructure Interdependency Model: Way Ahead,” Defense Research and Development
Canada, April 26, 2016, pg. 2-3, http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc225/p803698_A1b.pdf.
10
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or regional healthcare infrastructure. In 2018, Public Safety Canada released the “National Cross
Sector Forum 2018-2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure,” which sought to align the
different infrastructure sectors to coordinate development, regulatory, security and operational
oversight activities.11 The increasing frequency of multi-sector forums, workshops and initiatives
highlights the growing interconnectivity of the country’s infrastructure and essential services
landscape. It also reinforces the need to approach the overall cybersecurity challenge from a
centralized perspective with input from different industries and different levels of government.

Public and Private Infrastructure Governance
The key objective within this section is to outline the structure and governance models
overseeing the operation of critical infrastructure in Canada. It is not necessarily important to
highlight detailed management configurations for different sectors, such as the water delivery
system versus the financial system, but it is useful to understand how the federal government
generally interacts with lower levels of public authority and private industry within the essential
services space. This can reveal opportunities and weaknesses for cybersecurity policy reform
discussed later in the thesis, and it will reveal the extent of third-party vendor involvement within
the environment.
Canada’s 2011 critical infrastructure strategy noted that, “The responsibility for
protecting critical infrastructure in Canada is shared by federal, provincial and territorial
governments, local authorities, and [industry] critical infrastructure owners and operators—who
bear the primary responsibility for protecting their assets and services.”12 The last portion of this
statement is reflective of the current infrastructure landscape in Canada, where government
11

“National Cross Sector Forum 2018-2020 Action Plan For Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada,
May 11, 2015, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pln-crtcl-nfrstrctr-2018-20/index-en.aspx.
12
“National Strategy For Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada.
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authorities—primarily federal and provincial—retain little operational oversight of the
information systems and networks supporting essential services across the country. For example,
at the provincial level in Ontario, the government has specifically designated the private sector
responsible for the security and availability of seven of the 10 critical infrastructure sectors. The
Ontario Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program (OCIAP), last updated in April of 2017,
designates Food, Water, Telecommunication Systems, Electrical Power Systems, Gas and Oil,
Financial Services, Health Systems and Transportation Networks under private industry
operational control.13 Under the program’s policies, private owner-operators are responsible for
implementing adequate risk mitigation practices, business continuity plans and incident response
mechanisms to reduce physical and cyber risks across their respective sectors. This reliance in
Ontario on private operators—and their trusted third-party vendors—is consistent with other
provincial infrastructure arrangements across the country.
Another example of the prevalent role of private industry can be found in a 2012 Defense
Research and Development Canada report on British Columbia’s provincial critical
infrastructure, which noted that, “Infrastructure assets are often owned and operated by private
sector companies while government organizations are often responsible for public safety.”14 The
report adds that while responding to a regional or provincial emergency infrastructure event, “It
takes a team involving the private sector, the providers of the majority of services, to manage an
incident.”15 Considering the majority of national infrastructure is owned or operated by the
private sector, in addition to regulatory, licensing and inspection authorities being legislatively
13

Ontario Emergency Management (OEM), “Critical Infrastructure: Provincial Programs,” Ontario Ministry of
the Solicitor General, last modified April 19, 2017,
https://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/emcommunity/ProvincialPrograms/ci/ci.html.
14
Lynne Genik, “Operations Research Support For Critical Infrastructure Resilience In The Province Of
British Columbia,” Defense Research and Development Canada: Center for Security Science, October 16, 2012, pg.
6, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a568449.pdf.
15
Ibid.
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designated to provincial or federal government bodies depending on the sector, there is an
inherent diversity in oversight and control. This complex arrangement of responsibility and the
varying organizational priorities between government and industry stakeholders reinforces the
need for public and private partners to work collaboratively to ensure there is complete asset
awareness and security coverage for each sector.
Additionally, the 2018 National Cyber Threat Assessment and the 2011 National Strategy
for Critical Infrastructure recognize that to address this decentralized accountability arrangement,
private critical infrastructure owners and operators will need to be equally active participants
alongside government stakeholders to ensure expertise and information is shared in a timely and
useful manner.16 Not only will this help entire sectors develop meaningful incident response
policies and effective regulatory programs, but also, it can reduce communication barriers and
disconnects between private stakeholders who do not know how or who to contact in government
for infrastructure cybersecurity assistance. Since the networked and digitally connected
infrastructure and essential service base in Canada crosses provincial boundaries, draws on
federal and provincial legislative mandates, operates under private corporations and continues to
face an increasingly sophisticated cyber threat landscape, coordinated governance and clear
segregation of duties and responsibilities is becoming a national security priority.

Ontario’s Electrical Grid Case Study: Recognizing Sector Complexity
Although multiple infrastructure sectors have interconnected relationships, analyzing the
oversight structure of the electrical grid in Ontario is a useful case study for understanding how
government and private responsibilities intersect and overlap across Canada. Although technical
16

Canadian Center for Cyber Security, “National Cyber Threat Assessment 2018,” Communications Security
Establishment (CSE), pg. 7, December 6, 2018, https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/national-cyber-threat-assessment2018.

12

challenges will be addressed in a later chapter, this section aims to highlight how even
identifying relevant stakeholders, fostering collaboration and establishing adequate oversight
mechanisms to cover the entirety of a sector can be extremely difficult. Failing to share security
burdens and relying exclusively on the private or public portion of a sector has routinely resulted
in a lack of adequate security and risk controls. Any trusted organization or vendor providing
products, services or oversight within a given sector—electrical, energy or otherwise—is a
potential IT vulnerability. This means that all companies and government bodies who interact
with a sector from an operations, management or regulatory standpoint need to be included as a
possible entry point for a malicious cyber incident. The general purpose of this section is to use
Ontario’s electrical grid as an example of the scale and complexity associated with implementing
a robust cybersecurity oversight program at the critical infrastructure level.
The upstream and downstream components of Canada’s provincial electrical grids are
functionally integrated, geographically dispersed and involve many private and public
stakeholders. In Ontario, for example, power generation providers, regional transmission
operators, substation facilities and utility distribution organizations have complex regional
interconnectedness in addition to having responsibilities that span across the international border
with the U.S.17 Central to the operation of the overall grid is the Independent Electricity System
Operator (IESO), who is regulated and mandated by Ontario’s government and controls the daily
overall flow of electricity throughout the province.18 Key responsibilities of the IESO include
balancing inputs from private and public power generators in the nuclear, hydro and wind
industries to outputs being delivered by local utility companies.

17

Doug Vine, “Interconnected: Canadian And U.S. Electricity,” Center for Climate Change and Energy
Solutions, March 2017, pg. 2, https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/05/canada-interconnected.pdf.
18
“Ontario’s Energy Sector: Mission And Mandate,” Ontario Energy Board, accessed on December 23, 2018,
https://www.oeb.ca/about-us/mission-and-mandate/ontarios-energy-sector.
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Considering information assets supporting the IESO’s 24/7 operations play a paramount
role in the availability of electricity throughout the region, protecting these systems from
malicious cyber activity is a clear and necessary goal. However, as more stakeholders connect to
the grid—either as producers, distributors or vendors—there are more potential organizations
and networks that adversaries could attack to induce a cascading affect across the province. For
example, Ontario’s IESO energy development maps indicate that there are more organizations
being added to the already 129 different generation facilities active in the province combined
with the 73 unique distribution companies.19 The notion of securing the grid by solely protecting
cyber-connected assets at a central organization such as the IESO is flawed, as an actor directly
targeting multiple generation or distribution organizations can bypass the IESO and still impact
the province. This is in addition to the clear impact an IESO disruption itself could induce, which
is becoming a more serious risk as new IT interactions and potential vulnerabilities will also be
created with more entities connecting to the provincial balancing system.20
Many regional generator and distribution entities in Ontario also provide power for
residential and industrial facilities in the northeast U.S., whose power system is managed and
controlled by different IESOs. To address safety and operational considerations of cross-region
and cross-border activity, the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. (NPCC), a non-profit
regulatory body, was created to act as an additional layer of oversight by monitoring the
reliability of the bulk power system servicing the entirety of Northeastern North America. This

19
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), “Ontario’s Electricity System: Generation And
Transmission System Maps,” IESO Organization, last modified December 3, 2018,
http://www.ieso.ca/localContent/ontarioenergymap/index.html.
20
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), “Standing Committee Cyber Security Forum,” IESO
Organization, last modified January 2019, http://www.ieso.ca/en/Sector-Participants/EngagementInitiatives/Standing-Committees/Cyber-Security-Forum.

14

includes four Canadian provinces and seven U.S. states, and Ontario’s IESO.21 These
overlapping provincial and international management systems combined with the large quantity
of public and private stakeholders producing or delivering energy directly in Ontario reflects the
increasingly complex landscape of the province’s electricity sector. Further, with each
organization having different systems, vendors, technologies and data processing tools, the
amount of IT assets with potential vulnerabilities servicing the sector has grown exponentially—
raising the risk of a major incident occurring.22
Although this section only focused on one essential service in one region, the Ontario
electrical grid example highlights how even a provincially focused infrastructure system has a
wide range of stakeholders operating under extremely multifaceted and interconnected
arrangements. Recognizing this case study as a reflection of the breadth and diversity of
infrastructure sectors across Canada reinforces the notion that no entity or authority can
sufficiently maintain awareness of a given sector’s IT risks and cybersecurity challenges without
establishing robust public-private coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing.

21

“Northeast Power Coordinating Council: About,” NPCC, Inc., last modified July 5, 2017,
https://www.npcc.org/About/default.aspx.
22
Howard Solomon, “Ontario Electric Utilities To Report Soon On Their On Cyber Security Maturity,” IT
world Canada, January 18, 2019, https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/ontario-electric-utilities-to-report-soon-ontheir-on-cyber-security-maturity/414233.
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IDENTIFYING TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES

The critical infrastructure IT environment is undergoing rapid change, which has created
new opportunities for malicious actors while also introducing opportunities for new proactive
security policy and regulatory reform. Legacy IT systems within Canada’s infrastructure were
not developed with security as a core objective—particularly in industrial environments.23 The
underlying hardware and software responsible for the control environment and the actual
operation of infrastructure—such as water pumps or electricity nodes—were developed from a
reliability, safety and maintainability (RSM) perspective.24 This is an alternative approach to
system security compared to the standard system attributes of confidentiality, integrity and
availability (CIA), which are associated with most non-industrial corporate and government IT
environments today. The unique demands of critical infrastructure operation, such as zero
downtime and remote connectivity over wide areas, have created challenging conditions for
implementing strong cybersecurity programs. For example, although patching software bugs,
reconfiguring hardware and conducting vulnerability scans are all critical steps towards ensuring
CIA in IT systems, these activities also result in disruptions and delays that can be detrimental in
an infrastructure control system.25 These types of technical and policy challenges reinforce the
need for a tailored critical infrastructure cybersecurity policy distinct from other industries.
The objective of this chapter is to highlight the technical requirements and posture of
Canada’s industrial and non-industrial infrastructure while recognizing the key cyber
vulnerabilities associated with different technologies and processes. For example, it is important
23
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to understand the demand for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) processes in
industrial environments, as these Internet-linked tools provide significant financial benefits and
operating efficiencies. However, it is equally important to recognize the inherent IT risks
embedded in the operation of these systems, as growing connectivity with the Internet raises the
likelihood of incidents and their potential scale and cost.

Industrial IT Risk: Blurring of Corporate and Control Networks
The IT systems used in critical infrastructure sectors across Canada vary in function and
architecture, but two broad categories can be identified. Sectors where IT systems have a role in
managing physical technologies—such as IT processes governing the valve flow of natural gas
or oil in pipelines across Alberta—are referred to as industrial IT control environments.
Conversely, critical infrastructure sectors where control over physical processes is not a primary
function can be described as non-industrial environments. This section will focus on the key
technical features of industrial IT systems and their associated vulnerabilities, while the
following section will focus on non-industrial IT systems and their vulnerabilities.
The underlying cyber challenges that have emerged in industrial IT environments are a
result of two trends: first, corporate networks traditionally isolated from physical control centers
and systems are becoming increasingly integrated due to ICT evolutions and changes in
operating procedures—such as remote mobile access for corporate executives; second, the actual
operating technology that interacts with the physical equipment has become directly integrated
with Internet communication protocols and architecture standards.26 The combined effect of
these two trends has been the creation of new pathways for malicious cyber actors to
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compromise Industrial Control System (ICS) networks. While this integration has enabled
organizations to improve their equipment control processes and to become more efficient
through robust data collection, new issues such as unauthorized user intrusion or data
manipulation are exposing historically closed networks and assets to core vulnerabilities
associated with the Internet.
Understanding Control Network Architecture. Modern industrial IT environments
rely on the integration of ICS and SCADA processes to create highly optimized, automated,
efficient and situationally aware control networks. ICS refers to the different types of processes
and associated instrumentation—devices, systems, networks, and controls—used to operate and
automate industrial management.27 The resulting operational efficiencies have led to mass
adoption of ICS throughout manufacturing, rail and aviation transportation, energy, water
treatment and other critical infrastructure and key industries. While ICS tooling assists with the
physical operations, SCADA systems are designed to collect field data, transfer it to a central
computing facility, and display the information to the technician textually or graphically.28 An
organization’s SCADA architecture monitors, gathers, processes and transmits real-time data
from basic computing devices called programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to human operators
or technicians. These PLCs are directly linked to industrial systems and machinery, making their
individual computer security a key priority for the overall system’s cybersecurity.29 Altogether,
SCADA and ICS interaction allows industrial operators and any associated corporate or
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government regulators to monitor an entire geographically dispersed system from a central
location in real-time.
A key enabler of SCADA architectures and the linking of operational data to corporate IT
and management systems is the evolution of the ICT landscape. Wireless communications
systems combined with changes in business culture, such as allowing engineers, operators and
business executives to have remote access to real-time operational data, have created new
arrangements for connecting to corporate and control networks.30 For example, wireless
telecommunication infrastructure can enable enterprise decision-makers, such as a CEO, to view
the status of his/her railway system operations and make important recommendations while
offsite. This scenario requires that the executive have access to the control network’s
information, which could occur via an external Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection to
corporate web servers or directly to the control network’s information systems. This scenario
demonstrates one instance of how Internet and telecommunication infrastructure has blurred the
segregation of control and corporate networks. There are many additional circumstances where
remote connection and even direct remote interaction with the control network is necessary, such
as delivering real-time data to vendors servicing the infrastructure or to regulators overseeing
cross-sector stability and availability—a common feature of large distributed electrical systems
as noted in the Ontario grid case study.31
By outlining the control architecture, its primary data management processes and
operational objectives, this section has provided the necessary background for identifying the
key security challenges generated in industrial IT environments. Additionally, this background
will be essential in subsequent chapters where previous cyber attacks on critical infrastructure
30
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are analyzed, such as the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet computer worm targeting Iranian nuclear
infrastructure in 2010 or the cyber attack disabling major information assets across Ukraine’s
power grid in 2015.32
Cybersecurity Challenges in the Control Environment. Traditionally, the primary
tenant of ICS cybersecurity was the idea of security by obscurity, where IT operators relied on
the fact that malicious actors and even employees cold not understand the complex architecture
or mechanics of the IT systems in the control network.33 However, as corporate externally-facing
information assets and isolated control networks overseeing equipment continue to integrate, risk
mitigation practices such as security by obscurity are becoming increasingly obsolete. Further,
since control domains have historically been separated from the digital threats associated with
Internet connection, industrial security practices in the private and public sector have mainly
focused on physical issues—such as protecting against unauthorized individuals accessing
prohibited work areas or machinery. Evidence of the historic focus on physical threats at
industrial sites can be drawn from past Canadian critical infrastructure strategies where acts of
physical terrorism were of primary security concern, compared to the now dominating issue of
cybersecurity program failures.34
Contemporary cybersecurity issues in the control environment have many similar
overlapping challenges experienced in the traditional corporate environment. For example, both
networks and their information systems are at risk of hostile mobile code on endpoints,
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escalations of privileges through code manipulation, covert traffic analysis, network
reconnaissance, data gathering and exportation and unauthorized intrusions into the networks
either through or around perimeter defenses, such as a firewall.35 However, there are also distinct
vulnerabilities that differentiate cybersecurity requirements and limitations in the control
environment compared to the corporate environment. For example, the demands of control
system availability and reliability compared to the corporate IT perspective emphasizing
confidentiality and integrity makes certain security functionality inappropriate for industrial
environments.36 Some critical infrastructure sectors, such as transportation, chemical
manufacturing and energy distribution have time sensitive operational requirements, so the
latency—or the data transfer delay—issues associated with security tooling such as network
segmentation, demilitarized zones and patching may create performance disruptions.37 These
delays may only last a few (milli)seconds in certain cases, but this can still prove to be
detrimental to an ICS process. Another example would be requiring passwords for users working
in a control center, which is a universal authentication standard in corporate environments but
could hamper or interfere with emergency orders to override an ICS.
There are a range of technical vulnerabilities that threaten SCADA processes and ICS
applications, software and hardware due to the growing interconnected relationship between
corporate and control networks. A National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Special Publication in 2013 focusing on SCADA and PLC security issues outlined 68 general
vulnerabilities that threaten the control environment in a unique manner.38 These vulnerabilities
35
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are in addition to the ICS vendor-specific software and hardware flaws that are constantly being
identified by companies and security researchers across the world. Associated with the
vulnerabilities that NIST outlines is a list compiled and maintained by the U.S. ICS Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), which contains Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs) a malicious actor can deploy to specifically gain entry into a control network or a device
associated with an overall industrial system.39
Combining this ICS-CERT vulnerability research with the NIST documentation, in
addition to commentary from Public Safety Canada’s previous ICS Security Symposiums, it
becomes clear that the current threats facing critical infrastructure control environments in
Canada are becoming increasingly pervasive, complex and costly to mitigate.40 For example, a
2012 report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted that, “The current
trend towards Internet-linked connectivity between multiple SCADA systems and central office
networks has increased the vulnerability and the risk of cascading consequences across critical
infrastructure sectors.”41 The report later adds that, “The Netherlands Office of the National
Coordinator for Counterterrorism has forewarned that there exists a real possibility that Stuxnettype malware will be replicated by adversaries for cyber attacks on vulnerable critical
infrastructure systems.”42 This analysis highlights the growing urgency for cybersecurity policy
improvements and the need to address the more technical aspects of emerging and legacy ICS
vulnerabilities.
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Although this section will not identify all the vulnerabilities listed by standards,
government or vendor organizations working with industrial control technology, a few examples
will be outlined to help highlight the relationship of the industrial environment’s unique IT
architecture with some common exploits routinely compromising ICS and SCADA equipment. A
primary vulnerability in the industrial field stems from the corruption or compromise of
databases that are storing or processing real-time operational information. Databases used by
control systems almost always have a connection to other data libraries or computer historians
situated in the business or corporate network, where there are web-enabled applications capable
of interacting with untrusted external Internet users—perhaps business partners or regulators
requiring control environment information.43 Generally, data-driven applications rely on SQL to
navigate and communicate with relational databases and information management systems, such
as those in both control and corporate environments. An attacker can exploit the direct
communication relationship between these database and data historian systems, thereby
bypassing any security features that separate the networks.44
Using special SQL injection commands, an attacker can input query information to
enable entry into the database or the ability to enter additional commands to corrupt, steal or
manipulate its data.45 Considering control environments are highly reliant on this data’s accuracy
and integrity for operational management of equipment, the consequences of such an attack can
be severely damaging. SQL injection is a hacking technique that nearly every IT enterprise with
externally facing database applications needs to mitigate. However, this technique has unique
implications for the industrial environment as a compromise of control system database or its
43
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operational data can induce immediate physical disruption and damage to ICS-linked critical
infrastructure equipment—such as electrical units supporting power supply to a hospital.
Another major vulnerability associated with control systems comes in the form of ManIn-The-Middle (MITM) attacks.46 Although this technique is also common among malicious
attackers targeting traditional corporate environments, the impact on control systems can be
particularly significant considering the implications of corrupt and misleading data reaching
human or automated operators. MITM attacks do not necessarily rely on infecting computers
with malware on either end of a host-client system, but instead, aim to exploit the actual
communications equipment between two systems.47 MITM techniques due this by interfering
and manipulating the technical protocols that guide, deliver, and organize data packets crossing a
network. Management of different network communications in industrial IT environments is
facilitated by Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), which helps upkeep local routing from
network addresses to physical machine addresses at the data-link layer.48 Each device on the
control network maintains an ARP table so it knows which device address to send information to
or request data from to complete a task.49 Malicious actors can manipulate the ARP tables on the
network, resulting in a targeted device sending its communications to the malicious actor’s
network address unknowingly.
The end result of a MITM operation is that the attacking host can intercept sensitive data
in addition capturing, replaying, and injecting data into the network and have it interpreted as if it
were authorized and coming from a valid source. Since the unique speed and timing features
46
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required in a control network result in local users and hosts usually being designated as trusted
sources, data in the ICS environment is generally unencrypted and in plaintext format—further
enabling the attacker to digest and reverse engineer any relevant information that gets
intercepted.50 With this data, the attacker can induce significant damage to industrial equipment.
For example, by analyzing the network’s traffic the attacker can replicate a data payload to
resemble a normal communication instruction being sent to a piece of equipment, potentially
commanding the device to turn off or complete a destructive or disruptive action. The attacker
could also patiently collect baseline data and then insert that data to the control center’s display
screens to distract technicians or operators from the actual disruption occurring to PLC’s and
their normal outputs. Although MITM is a risk for both standard businesses and critical
infrastructure sectors, the impact these types of disruptions could have on an ICS environment is
exceptionally dangerous and technically challenging to counter.
It is also worth highlighting examples of key patch management and configuration
vulnerabilities, and the general operational requirements of the control architecture that make
these vulnerabilities difficult to resolve.51 Since control environments have unique uptime
demands, there are challenges for IT security teams aiming to improve the patch management
processes of ICS Operating Systems (OS) and other device software in the industrial space. For
example, due to the possible modifications to the underlying OS any update or patch may induce,
changes must undergo comprehensive testing.52 This often takes the vendor and operator
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extended periods of time, resulting in long windows of unpatched bugs and vulnerabilities
residing in ICS software until the updates are approved for implementation.
Additionally, it is common for government and private owner-operators to license ICS
and SCADA technologies from vendors for upwards of 20 years depending on the software or
hardware, which compares to an average of three years for standard business IT systems.53 The
reason for this is a combination of unique IT requirements on the control network and a
capability disconnect between vendors and operators in relation to the rapidly evolving security
needs of the ICS enterprise. For example, vendor produced off-the-shelf security applications
and devices, such as firewalls, antivirus systems, and patch management tools, can usually be
universally applied across common IT communication protocols at any company, organization or
government entity. However, in the ICS landscape, these same security tools may not have
interoperability with the control network’s unique protocols.54 This results in industrial operators
relying on highly tailored and industry-centric vendors to build out custom software, including
custom event logging systems, network port lockdown mechanisms, and features for disabling
USB media docks on ICS equipment.55 Due to this customization process, ICS products are
expensive and very difficult to replace, which typically forces IT assets to linger in the industrial
environment for longer periods of time compared to the standard business environment.
As vendors develop, market and sell new systems and tools, most of their financial
priorities and resources begin to shift form maintaining and updating their legacy products to
improving their new offerings.56 Consequently, there are often prolonged IT risks stemming from
software no longer being updated by the vendor and known vulnerabilities becoming recognized
53
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as accepted risk by infrastructure organizations. Corporate executives, recognizing that
constantly licensing new software or hardware would be prohibitively costly, accept the risk of
sustaining legacy systems to ensure uptime and operational efficiencies are maintained. Further,
any approach favoring routine OS updates or hardware component replacements creates
substantial technical and resource demands for both IT and ICS engineering staff on top of their
daily responsibilities. This occurs because the testing of new software, devices and systems to
ensure their compatibility with already deployed ICS tooling can require specialized facilities,
training, outsourcing and procedures not available on-demand to the organization.57 In certain
circumstances, an owner-operator will test these software patches or IT hardware upgrades on a
small segment of their live industrial environment to observe its impact, though this can be
incredibly dangerous due to the possibility of system disruptions cascading across the
environment or embedded malware distributing throughout the live network unbeknownst to the
technicians or engineers conducting the test. Although patch vulnerability issues will continue to
be explored in subsequent chapters when discussing past critical infrastructure cyber attacks, it is
worth briefly noting that poor patch management facilitated a vast portion of incidents during the
2017 WannaCry ransomware attacks.58 This highlights the material, financial and strategic
impact a lack of software updates and change management procedures for servers and OS
beyond their end-of-life date can induce in ICS and SCADA-based enterprises.
By reviewing a select number of key vulnerabilities and TTPs a malicious actor could
exploit in an industrial environment, it becomes clear that there are several feasible pathways for
unauthorized entry into some of the country’s most important industrial data systems and
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networks. Understanding how these cyber-enabled pathways relate to the control environments’
unique architecture and operational objectives will support strategic risk evaluations discussed in
following chapters. Key aspects of these evaluations will draw on this section’s analysis of SQL
injection, patch management limitations and other additional cybersecurity challenges
highlighted for the industrial IT environment.

Non-Industrial IT Risk: Financial System Case Study
Unlike industrial IT processes where SCADA technologies and ICS tools are present
across multiple sectors, non-industrial IT environments do not have the same widespread use of
common systems, processes or assets. This makes it rare for non-industrial IT systems to have
technical vulnerabilities that are equally threatening across multiple infrastructures. For example,
the core IT features that support 9-1-1 emergency communications within Public Safety
infrastructure are vastly different when compared to the IT systems that maintain and distribute
electronic personal records throughout healthcare infrastructure. Although both of these IT
systems are extremely important in each of their respective sectors, and while they do share some
common general vulnerabilities by virtue of being connected to Internet-facing systems, their
overall architectures and core system objectives are not the same. Due to the high-level
differences IT systems have across different non-industrial environments in Canada and
throughout the world, this section will only focus on the security challenges of a single sector—
the financial system. This sector’s cybersecurity challenges, from a risk and policy standpoint,
will be representative of the difficulties facing the non-industrial critical infrastructure
environment as a whole.
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By outlining and analyzing Canada’s financial system—including the nation’s IT systems
supporting transaction, clearing, settlement, payment and overall banking processes—this section
will demonstrate how non-industrial cyber vulnerabilities are equally threatening to the operation
of an essential service as the more popularized and discussed industrial vulnerabilities. Key
components of this case study will draw on security challenges associated with the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) infrastructure and Canada’s
domestic Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS), in addition to other private and public
components of the Payments Canada enterprise. Although this section will not specifically focus
on other sectors, it is worth mentioning that industries such as the Healthcare, Public Safety, ICT
and the Food Supply Chain are also considered non-industrial IT environments. Alike the
financial system, these sectors have limited cyber-physical dependences and interactions relative
to industrial environments utilizing ICS and SCADA processes, reinforcing the need to analyze
their vulnerabilities and IT risks in a separate technical context.
Canada’s Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI). The Bank of Canada defines an
FMI as, “A system that facilitates the clearing, settling or recording of payments, securities,
derivatives or other financial transactions among participating entities.”59 This infrastructure is
the core element of Canada’s economic activity, moving money and ensuring all parties’
accounts involved in a given transaction are balanced and accurate. Public and private
stakeholders within the FMI, including banks, credit unions, regulators, insurance companies and
large financial services firms process daily cash payments of $175 billion CAD and more than
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$500 billion CAD in trades of stocks and bonds.60 The system as a whole enables Canadian
consumers and firms to safely and efficiently purchase goods and services, interact with business
partners, make financial investments and transfer funds. The Bank of Canada recognizes that
disruptions to the FMI, “Have the potential to pose systemic risk to Canada’s financial system, in
that the inability of one participant to meet its obligations to the FMI could, by transmitting
financial problems through the FMI, cause other participants to be unable to meet their
obligations.”61 This type of cascading effect could cause a liquidity crisis across the country, a
major loss of investor confidence and a halt to national economic activity.
An underlying feature of the FMI’s operation is private sector involvement, not only in
terms of usage but also from an administrative and oversight standpoint. For example, Canada’s
LVTS, which is the primary electronic payment system responsible for clearing, distributing and
settling more than $50 trillion CAD every year across the country, is owned and operated by a
consortium of private financial institutions associated with Payments Canada—an organization
under the Ministry of Finance.62 The direct stakeholders within the LVTS include 17 private
institutions and public regulators, including Toronto Dominion Bank (TD), Royal bank of
Canada (RBC), Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Bank of Montreal (BMO),
Scotiabank and the Bank of Canada—who is the primary public operator within the system.63 On
the networking side, LVTS relies on SWIFT communications protocol—specifically the SWIFT
Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPN)—to support both domestic and international financial
messaging and routing operations, which occurs when Canadian banks or financial institutions
60
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need to conduct payment transaction services with each other or with foreign entities.64 65 66 On
the domestic front, the system uses a combination of the LVTS Direct Network and the SWIFT
network, which links the Canadian FMI across the country seamlessly.
Although there are many additional components of Canadian FMI beyond LVTS, in
terms of oversight, management and technical systems, this transaction infrastructure is a feature
of the economy that if disrupted would be strategically damaging to the country’s security and
prosperity. An example of an additional FMI system important to the Canadian economy is the
public-private operated Retail Payment System, formerly referred to as the Automated Clearing
Settlement System (ACSS). The ACSS is responsible for processing the vast majority of
payments in Canada, clearing and completing nearly 28 million transactions on the average
business day in 2017.67 This corresponds to about 99% of the daily transaction volume across the
country, though it only accounts for 13% of the value being handled in the economy at-large.68
This indicates that although LVTS processes only 1% of the transaction and payment traffic in
Canada, it handles close to 87% of the total value—which explains the large annual $50 trillion
CAD processing figure previously mentioned. Part of the key transactions that occur through
LVTS making it a central system for FMI operations includes wholesale money market lending
between banks to meet daily payout or cost obligations, foreign exchange purchases through
global markets, and time critical high-sum payments—such as a company needing to guarantee
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the delivery of funds for a large corporate merger.69 Any IT failures within this system would be
catastrophic to real-time money markets and the long-term economy, highlighting its position as
an important technical enabler of the overall financial system.
FMI Cybersecurity Challenges. When a cybersecurity failure at an individual company
or regulatory body threatens an IT asset directly connected to the LVTS or another system at a
bank, the implications of that breach could become a core concern for the integrity of the
national economy. While this is certainly a worst-case scenario, it is important to recognize the
possibility of such an attack to fully understand the strategic risks facing the sector’s most
important assets. Therefore, this section will aim to demonstrate how a technical vulnerability at
an individual institution, and even a single OS or application at that institution, could pose a real
threat to the availability and of the overall FMI.
LVTS and SWIFT both utilize unique software and protocols to communicate, log, and
process information for the Canadian economy domestically and globally. Each bank or financial
institution supporting LVTS and SWIFT networks also utilize in-house or vendor applications to
exchange corporate data with the overall system. This interaction is a key attack vector that may
be leveraged by malicious actors.70 For example, gaining entry into the LVTS software at any
one individual bank by compromising a specific corporate IT asset could allow an attacker to
manipulate LVTS transaction data, reporting metrics, disrupt management processes and cause
delays throughout the entire network. This type of vulnerability was exploited in 2016 when a
group of hackers leveraged authentication and network security weaknesses at the Bank of
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Bangladesh to access their national payment system.71 The Bank had recently implemented an
LVTS-type of infrastructure called RTGS to link the country’s payment system to the global
SWIFT network. As technicians were connecting the new software to the already deployed
SWIFT applications and terminals, they had set up a new wireless network that accidentally
connected Internet-facing servers with the core systems at the bank.72 During this setup process,
the technicians failed to properly configure a new switch they had fielded, which allowed traffic
from less secure information systems at the Bank to reach what should have been a segmented
network where SWIFT and the new RTGS software were situated. The result was financially
damaging, as after a year of network reconnaissance and eavesdropping, hackers were able to
locate the misconfigurations and find a pathway to deliver malware to the SWIFT and RTGS
servers at the Bank.73
Once attackers deployed their tailored malware onto the SWIFT Alliance Access (SAA)
application—which creates the technical messages for payment routing through domestic and
international financial networks—the malware altered two bytes of data on the SAA’s
authentication server.74 The alteration allowed the malware to bypass any validity checks in the
application, which provided the malicious users with authority to conduct a total of 35 SWIFT
transactions worth $951,000,000 USD—though only $81,000,000 USD was actually
transferred.75 The stolen money came from the Bank of Bangladesh’s account at the New York
Federal Reserve, who distributed the funds to multiple accounts around the world. Although this
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attack centered on a financial crime, the applications and servers the attackers had compromised
would have allowed for manipulation of transaction data registries and system logs, enabling the
users to disrupt settling, clearing and payment processes occurring across the country if their
objective had been different.
By exploiting the need for LVTS-type of software to have data exchange functionality
with both internal banking systems and the more secure and segmented SWIFT applications, the
attackers demonstrated how a payment system and an FMI at-large have susceptible IT
architectures that face ongoing and active security risks—including in Canada. This risk was
reinforced during a 2017 Payments Canada board meeting where new emergency operating
conditions were evaluated, which included discussion on network bypassing and re-routing best
practices in the event of systemic disruption or total system failure.76 Although the impact
severity of the Bank of Bangladesh breach is not considered a strategic disruption, it does
indicate the possibility for a single institution’s cybersecurity failures to have a cascading
financial and IT impact on a national or global payment system.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) list maintained by the MITRE
Corporation, with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NIST,
has a registered entry for a CGI Group Inc. software product—Logica HotScan—that directly
interfaces with the SWIFT SAA application and other payment system tools.77 This vulnerability
was discovered in 2012 by security researchers who identified a buffer-overflow flaw in the
product, which led to a filing with the CVE database known as CVE-2012-2624. HotScan has a
unique plugin for interaction with SWIFT software allowing banks and other financial
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institutions to automatically scan different types of payment messages for compliance and due
diligence purposes, particularly for interbank or wholesale payments such as those that traverse
Canada’s LVTS.78 The buffer-overflow vulnerability in the product allows an attacker to input
arbitrary or executable code into a data buffer, which is an area of information storage on a
computer system. Programs typically take inputted commands and store that data within defined
parameters of a given buffer, but malformed or malicious written inputs can result in larger
amounts of data trying to be stored in a buffer that does not meet the necessary storage
capacity.79 The result is data spilling over to adjacent buffers, where other code may be disrupted
or new malicious code from the input may be executed by one of the software’s programs. In
either case, the software’s functionality can be disrupted or even altered to conduct new
damaging behaviors as a result of the overflow attack.80
A 2017 operational assessment of the LVTS conducted by Payments Canada, titled
“LVTS Rules Overview,” specifically notes that CGI Group Inc. is a key software and central
system vendor for the payment infrastructure in Canada.81 82 Further, key services offered in the
HotScan product suite are implemented across multiple banks and different financial services in
the country, highlighting how a single company’s software vulnerability can result in
cybersecurity risk to the Canadian FMI at-large.83 Although the CVE database indicates that the
programming flaw was fixed, it took at least 34 days for the patch to be released post-discovery,
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meaning the vulnerability resided on national systems for an extended period of time.84 An
International Monetary Fund (IMF) report from 2015 assessing the resiliency of Norway’s FMI
and the equivalent of their LVTS noted that, “Software errors have been found to be very timeconsuming to locate and correct, and could serve as a single point of failure if not properly
resolved or mitigated.”85 The report adds that key challenges to updating these core FMI systems
is that the software is often developed by third-parties who have their own policies and timelines
for patch management, which could result in critical time delays for correcting a vulnerability or
bug during a system failure. Although the Canadian LVTS among other national systems often
have secondary and even tertiary backup IT infrastructure with dedicated off-site data
management systems, an underlying issue with the core OS and a slow patch process could pose
a threat to backup operations as well.86
The vulnerabilities assessed in this section, such as those associated with an individual
piece of software or the product of a single company—HotScan and SAA respectively—
highlight that seemingly small-scale cybersecurity failures can enable attackers to access
important data and systems essential to the nationwide financial infrastructure. The Chief
Operating Officer (COO) of Payments Canada, Filipe Dinis, reinforced this point in 2018 when
he stated that, “One area that we are concerned about is the growing operational risk from thirdparty providers such as the concentrated set of firms that provide many of the new technologies
to the financial sector. Reliance on these same third parties and the interconnections between
institutions could pose a systemic risk to the financial system. Greater coordination is essential
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for addressing this issue.”87 His comments go on to add that many security testing and
management services provided by these vendors fall outside of the oversight of LVTS regulators,
which forces the system as a whole to depend and trust on the traditionally less rigorous
cybersecurity standards and practices of third parties. It is worth noting that Payments Canada
aims to launch their new LVTS infrastructure (Lynx) beginning in 2020, where CGI among other
vendors will continue playing critical roles in supporting IT and routing systems between the
banks—including with partners such as SWIFT.88 This means that the involvement of private
sector IT vendors, companies and products will continue acting as a central role in supporting the
Canadian FMI, indicating that cyber risk will remain and likely grow across this critical
infrastructure sector.
The last portion of this section will highlight Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks as an example of a non-strategic but growing risk. Due to their routine occurrence at
financial and banking institutions around the world, it is important to recognize DDoS activity as
another increasingly relevant threat to FMI operations and systems. For example, DDoS attacks
do not necessarily threaten the functionality of the overall FMI or pose a systemic threat to the
national economy, but they do threaten the availability of the FMI for the retail customer and
consumer base in Canada. A 2013 DDoS attack targeting Canada’s TD Bank is an example of
such an occurrence where customers trying to access their online banking portals lost access to
primary services.89 This event was significant for the bank itself and for thousands of clients, but
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it certainly did not threaten the integrity of the FMI or pose a strategic risk to Canada and other
financial institutions.90
A DDoS attack is a malicious attempt to disrupt normal traffic flowing towards server,
applications or networks.91 The attackers use malware to infect large numbers of computer or
Internet-linked devices to form a botnet, which is then controlled and directed to flood traffic
towards a specific target—such as a web server responsible for operating a bank’s website or
customer portal. Banks tend to have a large externally facing Internet presence due to their daily
interactions with customers, which makes them particularly susceptible to a DDoS operation.92
Therefore, it is important to recognize this attack vector as a growing threat to the FMI
considering the scale of attacks are growing in addition to the number of institutions that could
be targeted during one synchronous operation.
In February of 2018, three international banks based in the Netherlands experienced a
coordinated DDoS attack disrupting mobile banking accessibility for over three days.93 In 2012,
six major U.S. banks, including Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, U.S. Bancorp, Citigroup
and PNC Bank, faced a highly coordinated and persistent DDoS attack that lasted over a
month—completely disrupting certain client services for extended periods of time.94 These
examples of DDoS sophistication and breadth indicate that a shift in their attack impact is
occurring, where financially and administratively damaging operations are beginning to pose a
direct strategic challenge. Other evolving threats also exist, such as cyber attacks targeting the
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over 18,000 Automated Teller Machines (ATM) across the country or the information systems
supporting the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).95 These types of attacks may induce short term—
and in the case of TSX, possibly long-term strategic—credit issues in the economy, a loss of
confidence in investment and pose branding, public image and monetary risks for individual
companies.
Non-industrial IT environments will have different technical challenges for different
critical infrastructures, though a general reliance on core systems interacting with public-private
stakeholders nationwide is consistent across all sectors. Whether the LVTS for the financial
sector, common wireless networks for the telecommunications sector or synchronized national
databases for patients across the healthcare sector, disruptions to these IT assets at a national
scale poses severe short and long term risks to the country. Although this section focused on a
financial industry case study and the unique technical challenges the FMI must address, every
other non-industrial IT landscape will also have their own unique cybersecurity issues—such as
the rapidly growing presence of IoT devices in the healthcare sector and in the food supply
chain. By highlighting the technical impact breaches and compromises can induce on the
financial system, this section has demonstrated that critical infrastructure cybersecurity is a
strategic issue equally important to mitigate in the non-industrial IT environment compared to
the more commonly analyzed industrial control environment.

95

Gendron and Rudner, “Assessing Cyber Threats To Canadian Infrastructure,” 16.

39

EMERGING IT SYSTEMS AND NEW CYBER RISKS

New technologies in the processing, networking and data management space are
changing how critical infrastructure is operated and managed. These changes are not only having
an impact on how stakeholders interact with important assets, but they are also having a security
impact. For example, sector operators, owners and regulators in both industrial and nonindustrial environments are shifting to outsourced cloud architectures for uptime and cost
benefits, but at the same time, these stakeholders are recognizing security risks such as not
knowing where data is being stored or which external parties have administrative access to
critical systems. Although the risks associated with new data and computing technologies are
causing issues for both the infrastructure community and more traditional organizations
simultaneously, there are some unique challenges that non-infrastructure stakeholders will not
need to mitigate—at least not with the same urgency. The key technologies that this chapter will
discuss includes SDN, NFV, 5G, IoT and cloud computing. Although only a few examples and
applications of these technologies will be analyzed, the chapter will sufficiently demonstrate that
new IT processes are creating issues current infrastructure cybersecurity policy and tools are not
equipped to address.

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and Cloud Computing
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging trend that is transforming how
networking software and hardware are managed—not only in the telecommunications industry
but also for the standard business environment. SDN is an approach to network management that
allows administrators to have a more holistic and accurate view of a network’s assets and
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operations.96 A key component of this approach is enabling the operator to have access to a
centralized interface to control and shape the network in real-time.97 As opposed to continuously
deploying and reconfiguring a wide-array of connected hardware, SDN allows for a virtual
infrastructure to provide a more flexible traffic, bandwidth and patch management system.
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) has facilitated this trend by allowing traditionally
hardware-based operations and equipment to become digital.98 This has included firewalls,
traffic load balancers and other non-customizable hardware devices becoming virtual machines
instead of physical machines. For the ICT sector specifically, these technologies are allowing
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Communication Service Providers (CSP) to improve how
their data centers, hardware backbones and central management systems interact and function on
a daily basis. As of 2018, a large telecommunication provider in Canada, Bell Inc., began
deploying NFV and SDN tooling to accelerate its network transformation, highlighting that this
shift is already occurring across the country.99
In addition to the ICT sector, SDN and NFV are transforming IT operations throughout
other critical infrastructure environments. While this has provided operational benefits, these
new networking systems are also introducing new cybersecurity challenges into already
vulnerable assets. For example, the U.S. President’s National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee (NSTAC) developed a report in 2017 noting that, “SDN/virtualization
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requires the existence of more software than previous security solutions, and software may
present more opportunity for bugs or malware to be introduced into the environment.”100 The
report also added that, “Given the centralization of control with SDN, there is increased risk that
if the central controller has a software vulnerability issue, then the impact could be dispersed
across the entire network.”101 The NSTAC comments essentially highlight that the very
flexibility offered by SDN/ NFV to network managers will create a centralized control node that
could be exploited by attackers to cause widespread damage at a rapid rate.
During a telecommunications conference in March of 2017, John Stratton, a co-chair of
NSTAC’s Emerging Technologies Strategic Vision Subcommittee, noted that, “The Department
of Homeland Security should begin to plan strategically for how SDN could affect critical
infrastructure, and modify its cybersecurity guidance to accommodate SDN’s impact.”102 Risks
are also apparent from a more technical perspective. For example, increased reliance on NFV
and networking protocols will mean that traditionally single-tasked hardware devices are now
going to be replaced with virtual machines conducting a wide-range of complex activities. On a
standard network switch, router or firewall, these activities were typically designated to an
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC)—such as a data packet processor.103 An ASIC is a
very effective, hardened and tailored device built for one primary network function.104 Moving
these tasks to a software-based system will significantly increase the risk and potential impact of
DDoS attacks, which are significantly more capable of overwhelming an ordinary central
processing unit (CPU) supporting common software compared to a traditional hardware device
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with dedicated ASICs.105 Different types of DDoS attacks would be highly effective in
increasing traffic loads and compromising the functionality of these software-dependant
networks, highlighting how attackers looking to disrupt newly linked emerging and legacy
technologies could leverage classic exploitation techniques.
SDN and NFV are emerging trends that have grown alongside the ongoing shift to cloudbased IT architectures. The cloud is a backbone computing infrastructure that allows customers
to deploy their software and hardware assets in a data center maintained, supported and
monitored by a third-party provider.106 Customers can remotely create virtual machines within
designated digital space in the data center and could also alter the number, interaction and
configuration of these machines using a control interface—which is typically referred to as a
hypervisor.107 Cloud computing provides governments, companies and organizations with
powerful computing systems at reduced cost, increased performance and rapid scalability.
Critical infrastructure stakeholders are becoming increasingly attracted to these cost and
operational benefits, indicating that the country’s most vital systems will likely be introduced to
new cloud-based security risks moving into the future.
DHS released an information package in 2017 titled “Risks to Critical Infrastructure That
Use Cloud Services.”108 The package not only highlights that U.S. critical infrastructure owners,
operators and vendors are increasingly shifting their IT presence from local environments to both
hybrid and completely cloud based environments, but also that a range of new security
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challenges are emerging as a result. Similar shifts are also occurring across Canada, with public
and private stakeholders leveraging cloud architectures for different purposes and processes.109
The DHS document notes that, “Although cloud services and physical information technology
infrastructures are vulnerable to some common attack vectors, such as Denial of Service attacks,
cloud services are also potentially vulnerable to a number of unique attack vectors such as
Hyperjacking.”110 Considering the previous chapter identified some different attack vectors and
techniques an actor could use to infiltrate current and legacy IT systems across different sectors,
it is worth identifying some unique new threats that specifically impact cloud computing.
Hyperjacking is a type of attack where a malicious actor will aim to compromise a virtual
environment’s hypervisor, which is essentially the software that manages virtual machines on the
physical hardware in a data center.111 This can include an actor taking over remote root control
of the hypervisor or the installation of a rogue hypervisor. If an actor could compromise this
central and underlying management software, they would be able run undetectable programs
below the OS of different virtual machines on the cloud.112 The sensitive information held on
these compromised applications and servers could be maliciously altered or disrupted, meaning
an entire organization’s data could be at risk. Dimitri McKay, a Senior Security Architect and
Systems Engineering Expert with Splunk Inc. refers to hypervisor compromises as a, “Single
point of failure in security.”113 New attack techniques, such as hyperjacking, are creating
significant risks to all industries and organizations who move IT operations to a cloud
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environment, though any type of vulnerability that results in a single point of failure is
particularly concerning for critical infrastructure stakeholders due to their customer’s
dependencies.
Another vulnerability unique to cloud environments relates to multi-tenancy or the norm
of having shared physical and virtual computing space within data canters where multiple
organizations have assets. Although a cloud computing environment allows tenants to have costeffective on-demand scaling options, it also enables Side-Channel attacks.114 A Side-Channel
attack exploits the physical co-residency of virtual machines.115 If an attacker has access to a
malicious virtual machine operating on the same physical hardware as a target virtual machine,
the attacker can measure circuitry heat, electromagnetic emissions and processing time on the
hardware to gather information about the cryptographic encryption keys being used by a certain
computer process on the target’s machine or server.116 After enough analysis, the attacker can
leverage the collected signature information to disturb the process or break into the targeted data.
This highly technical vulnerability is unique in cloud environments due to the common overlap
of customer data and processes on shared hardware assets. As critical infrastructure IT systems
continue shifting to cloud-based operations, executives and security teams need to ensure that the
proper controls or mitigation techniques are in place to address this threat.
The vulnerabilities and challenges assessed in this section highlight the active security
risks SDN, NFV and cloud computing deployments will pose for any industrial and nonindustrial critical infrastructure sector seeking to utilize these technologies without updated
cybersecurity practices. Ensuring that policy and strategy address these risks in addition to the
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legacy IT vulnerabilities explored in the previous chapter will be essential mitigating the cyber
threats to critical infrastructure in Canada moving into the future.

5G and Internet of Things (IoT)
5G is the next generation of broadband Internet connection and it will enable much faster
network speeds with greater data carrying and relaying capacity relative to previous wireless
networks. Although the actual national Internet and communication backbone in Canada will
undergo a long transformation process to actually build-out the 5G networks, private
organizations will begin to deploy local 5G networks much sooner.117 There are numerous
technical reasons why 5G will have transformative impacts across multiple infrastructures in
Canada, but a key feature is reduced latency and the enabling of a range of new processes and
technologies that are not possible over 4G networks.118 For example, autonomously driving
vehicles will be able to meet the near-instantaneous needs of inter-vehicle-to-vehicle
communications, revolutionizing the Transportation infrastructure. Dr. Joy Laskar, co-founder
and Chief Technology Officer of Maja Systems, provides a useful reference for understanding
the speed of 5G networks relative to current technology by noting that, “With an advanced Wi-Fi
connection, it would take 230 days to transfer a weeks-worth of data from a self-driving car.”119
Without the speeds and data capacities of 5G networks, certain technologies will simply not be
scalable. Another example of 5G’s impact relates to how telemedicine (or eHealth) can become a
more practical solution for expanding the reach of Healthcare infrastructure, as faster real-time
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robotic and visual controls will offset the Internet-delays experienced over vast distances during
remote treatments, invasive surgeries, operations or scans/ tests.
Perhaps most importantly, 5G will enable the growth and application-at-scale of IoT
devices. Having the capacity to manage more connectivity and data will allow for a dramatic
increase in Internet-connected processes and systems across consumer, business, infrastructure,
and government industries.120 As this increase in connectivity occurs with 5G networks and IoT
device deployment, multiple sectors will also need to address new cybersecurity challenges. For
example, IoT developments will lead to larger botnet and DDoS attacks, creating new risks for
all critical infrastructure entities with externally facing systems. This issue has been recognized
across the energy sector specifically, where the linking of sensors and small computing or
signaling devices across pipelines, drilling sites, field equipment and transport vehicles has
become standard practice. Phil Neray, Vice President of industrial cybersecurity at a security
firm in Boston called CyberX, noted in October 2018 that, “To reduce costs and optimize
operations, oil and gas companies are deploying more and more IoT sensors so they can closely
track flows and data related to production operations. This has resulted in increased connectivity
between IT and operational networks, which has increased the attack surface and hence the
risk.”121 The same IoT deployments are occurring across Canadian natural gas and oil
distribution infrastructure, which has been evident with Canada’s largest telecommunication and
Internet provider—Rogers Communications Inc.—restructuring its specialized IoT subscription
services to meet growing energy sector demands.122
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There are a several technical cybersecurity challenges associated with IoT devices that
will have unique impacts across the industrial IT environments in Canada. For example, many
devices that will perform a single-task—such as monitoring gas flow through a pipe—have very
small amounts of processing power and memory, which leaves little storage room for security
programing or functionality.123 124 Another impact of small storage and processing capacity is
reduced ability to receive secure software patches, as certain interconnected IoT devices will be
unable to manage encrypted data in transit.125 This can provide attackers with an opportunity to
intercept, alter and add malicious code to over-the-air (OTA) updates being sent to IoT devices.
Once the update is installed and the payload of the malware operationalized, the device will be
compromised. In addition to encryption issues, another challenge with IoT patch management is
that many devices contain an underlying OS that is simply not capable of being updated after
being deployed in the wild. These devices may even be cheaper to physically replace than
actually patch.126 However, since IoT devices in the industrial space tend to be geographically
dispersed and in hard to reach places, the products are and will continue to be routinely operated
beyond their end-of-life date. This leads to a build-up of vulnerabilities overtime and the
accumulation of significant IT risk across the industrial enterprise.127 128 While adding 5G
enabled IoT technologies to the SCADA and ICS environment will certainly offer increased
oversight, monitoring and management capabilities, new patch management challenges—rooted

123

Nermin Hajdarbegovic, “Are We Creating An Insecure Internet of Things (IoT)?” Security Challenges and
Concerns,” Top Tal, February 2016, https://www.toptal.com/it/are-we-creating-an-insecure-internet-of-things.
124
Roman Garber, “What Makes IoT Security So Tough?” DZone, June 11, 2018,
https://dzone.com/articles/what-makes-iot-security-so-tough.
125
Xu Zou, “IoT Devices Are Hard To Patch: Here's Why—And How To Deal With Security,” Tech Beacon,
accessed on January 19, 2019, https://techbeacon.com/security/iot-devices-are-hard-patch-heres-why-how-dealsecurity.
126
Hajdarbegovic, “Are We Creating An Insecure Internet of Things (IoT)?”
127
Ibid.
128
Eric Rogge, “Why IoT And Not SCADA?” Eckerson Group, September 23, 2015,
https://www.eckerson.com/articles/why-iot-and-not-scada.

48

in encryption, processing or other variables—will simply exacerbate the security issues already
stressing legacy IT equipment throughout Canadian infrastructure.
It is important to note that supply chain risk is a key technical and policy-based
vulnerability emerging from the deployment of 5G networks in Canada. Government and
industry stakeholders across Canada are currently debating potential risks emerging from the use
of 5G technologies associated with foreign owned enterprises, such as China’s
telecommunication giant Huawei and chip manufacturer ZTE. In January of 2019, U.S. Senator
Mark Warner stated that, “Our telecom networks are totally meshed together and if there was a
vulnerability in the Canadian system, it would make America vulnerable. And vice-versa.”129 He
added that, “My specific concerns are particularly as we move into the next generation of
wireless—the so-called 5G networks—that if a country were to purchase this equipment, it might
have built-in backdoors so that, down the line, once the equipment was installed, the Chinese
could intercept messages, communications and violate the security of the networks.”130 The
prospect of a backdoor in the ISP and national communication backhaul infrastructure would be
a cybersecurity vulnerability of unprecedented scale, posing a strategic risk to multiple sectors
across Canada and raising the prospect of widespread intellectual property (IP) theft. It is
significant, however, that there is technical disagreement around the practicality and capability of
embedding malware or using malformed firmware on hardware products being delivered as part
of Chinese 5G equipment, and that ongoing hardware and software investigations are not
necessarily consistent with Warner’s claims.
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Nevertheless, many Canadian allies—including the U.S. Britain, Germany, Japan and
Australia—have considered banning Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese telecommunications
products.131 Security researchers at Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) and from the country’s Huawei Cybersecurity Evaluation Center (HCSEC) have noted
in public disclosures that there were instances of unexplainable code in software products and
operating issues with 5G-hardware equipment that raised suspicion.132 This prompted British
security officials to conduct more comprehensive and long-term supply chain investigations.
However, in February of 2019, sources from Britain’s National Cyber Security Council (NCSC)
acknowledged that a complete ban of Huawei from national telecom networks did not serve a
useful cybersecurity purpose.133 Although this contradicts what the council recognized a year
earlier, where they emphasized supply-chain issues with Chinese equipment, their new position
highlighted that the country’s specialized laboratories—like HCSEC—and national intelligence
agencies will be able to mitigate any threats with proactive equipment assessments and risk
controls. These new comments stemming from British media and government sources indicate
that a select amount of products and services may be banned, but it is unlikely for a
comprehensive blanket-based approach to be implemented.
Conversely, Mike Burgess, director-general of the Australian Signals Directorate, led a
stronger opposition movement in Australia over the past few years. This was evident by his
comments in October of 2018 stating that, “Australia’s critical infrastructure including electricity
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grids, water supplies and hospitals could not have been adequately safeguarded if Chineseowned telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE Corp. were allowed to help roll out the
nation’s 5G network.”134 His statement added that cybersecurity researchers and engineers
throughout the intelligence community in Australia had identified these companies and their
products as high risk vendors posing an active technical threat to the country’s systems—though
public release of evidence has yet to occur.
The ICT sector is undergoing rapid change and the growing reliance on 5G networks will
continue to deepen cross sector dependencies in Canada. With the majority of critical
infrastructure relying on the ICT backbone in some way, developing national cybersecurity
policies to address 5G vulnerabilities will continue to be a growing strategic imperative for the
government. Steve Buck, COO at a network security company called Evolved Intelligence,
reinforced this point in 2018 by stating that, "5G will power critical infrastructure, so a cyberattack could stop the country."135 In addition to forming technical security standards, supply
chain policy risks must also be addressed—not just to respond to possible Chinese governmentlinked issues but to other foreign and domestic threats as well. This is a complex task as new
import control mechanisms, IT audit and testing procedures, bill-of-material best practices and
approved product list assessments will all need to be implemented and regulated by the federal
government.136 137 To ensure the country can mitigate these developing risks in a timely manner
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and to maintain similar standards with international allies, Ottawa should prepare—at least
conceptually—for how resources will be allocated and which public-private partnerships will be
needed for a national 5G supply chain risk management project to succeed.
It is equally important to recognize the closely linked IoT vulnerabilities and risks—
previously referenced in this section—that are directly emerging as a result of the new capacity
and network speeds of 5G. Dave Burstein, a 5G expert with Wireless One Inc., highlights that,
“The problem is that a lot of these IoT devices, think small sensors measuring air humidity or
temperature, for example, are cheap and need to have a very long battery life. Implementing
good security into such devices will require more processing power and this drives up costs and
drains power, which is why it won't happen.”138 The operational requirements of certain IoT
devices will limit adequate internal countermeasures, meaning public and private critical
infrastructure owner-operators will need to develop and field external security mechanisms to
mitigate this area of growing cyber risk and IT exposure. Altogether, 5G and IoT technologies, in
addition to SDN, NFV and cloud computing, will reshape how individuals, businesses,
infrastructure and the government will operate and interact on a daily basis. This transformation
will provide many functional and cost benefits, but it will simultaneously introduce unique
security challenges and vulnerabilities that may provide adversaries with a strategic advantage
over Canada.
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MAPPING CANADA’S CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE

There are a variety of threat actors with different levels of technical sophistication,
funding, motives and objectives interested in exploiting cyber vulnerabilities in Canada’s critical
infrastructure. Many of these actors are associated with foreign intelligence agencies and even
military computer security groups, while others are linked with international terrorist
communities or domestic political extremists. This chapter will identify different individuals,
groups or nations who have expressed interest in or have conducted activities consistent with
cyber attack on critical infrastructure in Canada or against like-minded allies. Many adversaries,
including Iran and China, have demonstrated their ability to infiltrate the information systems
supporting different critical infrastructure sectors throughout the world. Although it is highly
unlikely that any nation-state would seek to disrupt an essential service in Canada during
peacetime, many government’s continue to compromise IT assets before conflict for economic
purposes or to conduct network reconnaissance and map out possible attack vectors for the future
should hostilities arise. This reinforces the need for constant cyber defense at any given
geopolitical condition. Further, since non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, could attack
during peacetime or conflict, it becomes clear that Canada’s critical infrastructure faces
disruptive threats on an ongoing consistent basis. By discussing topics such as cyber warfare and
cyber terrorism, in addition to analyzing the shift of the cyber domain to being labeled as not just
an enabler but also an actual warfighting environment, this chapter will address the issue of
Canadian infrastructure being targeted by some of the most advanced cyber actors in the world.
It is also important to recognize that the highly advanced tools and TTPs needed to
disrupt infrastructure in Canada may make it difficult for terrorist or hacktivist groups and even
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individuals relative to nation-states to conduct a successful cyber attack. However, failing to
recognize a threat actor simply due to a lack of technical know-how or resources can lead to gaps
in cybersecurity programs, strategy and policy, as that same actor could outsource an operation
or develop a capability over time. In addition to nation-state cyber warfare and terrorist group
threats, this chapter will also highlight risks emanating from catastrophic IT accidents, insider
threats, and espionage. Although a general high-level cyber threat assessment for Canada would
also include a range of criminal organizations and individual hackers interested in money
laundering, fraud, identity theft and other cyber-enabled crimes, these types of threats do not fall
within the scope of actors explicitly targeting critical infrastructure for strategic security or
financial purposes impacting the national wellbeing—though this chapter will highlight an
exception for intellectual property (IP) theft. Therefore, the focus of this chapter will be on the
motivations, technical sophistication and past activities of adversarial state, non-state, foreign
and domestic actors who have demonstrated a capability or intent to disrupt critical IT systems
supporting the country’s most important systems.

Nation-States, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) and Cyber Warfare
The proliferation of Internet-connected technologies and the reliance on cyberspace to
facilitate data and communication networks has resulted in governments, foreign intelligence
agencies and militaries around the world funding, researching and deploying offensive and
defensive cyber capabilities. The national security policy of most advanced countries now
includes some form of cyber strategy, with many supporting the creation of tactical and strategic
warfighting doctrines, and defensive countermeasures, in the cyber domain. A comprehensive
list maintained by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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identifies that 78 nations have publically released a national military cyber strategy specifically
outlining threats, requirements and operational objectives.139 Canada has followed this trend with
the release of the “National Cyber Security Strategy” in 2018, which calls for developing the
Canadian government and military’s use of cyberspace and the need to address a range of
threats—including state and state-sponsored hackers.140
There are several other indications that Canada has recognized and initiated a response to
the growing threat of major cyber conflict. For example, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)
launched a new Cyber Operations Unit in 2018 tasked with computer network attack and defense
responsibilities in addition to growing the scope of the military’s Directorate of Cyber
Operations Force Development.141 A public statement from the Royal Canadian Navy in 2018
also mentioned that the CAF was undergoing a national cyber exercise, which was referred to as
Exercise Cyber Challenge (ECC).142 The ECC referenced cyberspace as an operational military
domain, reinforcing the CAF’s efforts to develop, test and field a range of capabilities for both
pre-conflict environments and active hostilities. These efforts are being undertaken in
coordination with other partners, such as the Communications Security Establishment (CSE),
who is the country’s cryptographic and signals intelligence agency. On the defensive side, the
CAF in partnership with Public Safety Canada is working to implement the “Integrated Defense
Plan 2018-2023”, which specifically highlights the joint military-government role to, “Protect
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Canadians and our critical infrastructure from cyber threats.”143 Although the CAF deals with a
range of tactical issues as well, such as forward unit cyber capabilities in conflict zones and
theater-level communication security (COMSEC), this section will only focus on the high-level
threats that nation-state cyber warfare, competition and conflict poses to the civil safety of the
country and critical infrastructure as a whole.
As Canada continues to grow its military and government presence in the cyber domain,
foreign adversaries have done the same and have specifically emphasized critical infrastructure
as a priority target. Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are actively scanning
and exploiting vulnerabilities across the Canadian business, non-profit and government
landscape to enable operations at a later date—such as after hostilities initiate. Often, these
countries will distribute the cyber tools their intelligence or military forces have developed to
private or state-sponsored hacking groups, creating a political liability barrier between the cyber
activities of the private group and the orders and objectives disseminating from the government.
The 2018 National Cyber Threat Assessment references this challenge in the context of critical
infrastructure, noting that, “State-sponsored cyber threat actors will continue to conduct cyber
espionage against Canadian businesses and critical infrastructure to advance their national
strategic objectives.”144 An example of this threat was demonstrated in 2013 when an Iranianlinked hacking group, identified as APT33, infiltrated the Ministry of Labour attempting to
access Canada’s national Secure Channel Network (SCN).145 146 APT33 is classified as an
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Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), which is a malicious computer attack where a person or
group gains unauthorized access to a network and remains undetected for an extended period.
The aim of the attack is to patiently map the network for additional vulnerabilities, slowly
escalating user privileges or uploading backdoors to enable remote interaction with compromised
information systems. APTs have traditionally been associated with nation-state actors due to the
significant financial, talent and technical resources that usually support their operations.
Since APT33’s espionage operation targeted the SCN, which is a highly secured and
encrypted communications system that interacts with many critical infrastructure sectors in
Canada, there would have been a significant strategic risk to the country if the hackers
successfully escalated their operation.147 It is important to note the intricate relationship many
state-sponsored hacking groups have with their affiliated governments, as this highlights how the
country’s foreign, geopolitical and strategic objectives in cyberspace are essentially outsourced
to private entities. For example, FireEye and a Russian-based cybersecurity firm, Kaspersky Lab,
have both released reports detailing the elaborate connections between APT33 and the Iranian
government’s Nasr Institute.148 149 This institute, which is actually a contractor jointly operated
by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij Cyber Council, has routinely
conducted operations directly and indirectly in support of the country’s Ministry of Intelligence.
Government reports from the U.S. and Israel also indicate that many of the personnel believed to
be associated with APT33 have previously worked in other Iranian hacking groups—such as the
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Nasr Institute—and within the Iranian government itself.150 When groups such as APT33 target
Canada, the threat is not from a group of private individuals but rather a nation-state with a
substantial amount of resources and a geopolitical agenda unfavorable to Canadian security.
In addition to Iran, other nation-state adversaries and their contracted affiliates have also
demonstrated intent and capability to infiltrate Canadian and allied critical infrastructure
networks. This is not only evident by identifying attacks directly impacting Canada, but also by
recognizing the cyber activities Canadian adversaries have conducted against partner nations—
such as the members in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance or allies like Japan and South Korea.
For example, in 2017 after a Chinese-linked attack targeted Australian government systems
connected to a defense contractor, the Federal Minister responsible for national cybersecurity
policy noted that, “Most concerning, is that these attacks were more elaborate than the attacks we
have seen in previous years. It is clear that the malicious actors looking to target major systems
and critical infrastructure are increasing the sophistication of their vectors.”151 This came a year
before Australia and the U.S. jointly condemned a Chinese hacking group referred to as APT10,
who was acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security attempting to infiltrate the
networks of government and industry stakeholders in at least 12 countries.152
Acting Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray commented on
APT10’s activities, arguing that, “The cyber threats from China, which date back to 2006, have
never been more severe or more pervasive. No country poses a broader more severe long term
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threat to our nation's economy and cyber infrastructure than China.”153 These comments are
consistent with China’s creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in 2015, which has now
integrated, improved and operationalized the country’s military, commercial and intelligence
cyber resources under one branch.154 Similar recognition of the critical infrastructure risks posed
from China and their sponsored affiliates is also apparent in Japan, where a 2017 National
Institute of Information and Communications Technology document noted that the majority of
the reported critical infrastructure cyber attacks against the country stemmed from Chinese
sources—with North Korean APT groups being the second most common source.155
Within Canada’s closest alliance circles, the U.S. has been the most vocal country in
recognizing that advanced Chinese hacking groups, government intelligence agencies, and
military units are actively exploiting cybersecurity weaknesses in critical infrastructure for
strategic purposes. For example, the 2019 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” developed by the
Director of National Intelligence explicitly outlines how China has been targeting the critical
infrastructure networks of the U.S. and its allies to support long-term security objectives, short
term commercial interests and to gain leverage in the event of major hostilities—kinetic or nonkinetic.156 The Assessment notes that for many years Beijing has emphasized, “Cyber espionage
to collect intelligence and targeted our critical infrastructure to hold it at risk,” adding that,
“China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects
on critical infrastructure—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
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United States.”157 However, this risk is equally present in Canada, where cybersecurity experts at
CSE and CSIS have routinely highlighted how sophisticated cyber capabilities are being
leveraged by nation-states to infiltrate industrial and non-industrial infrastructure sectors. An
internal government memo exchanged between Public Safety Canada and intelligence partners in
2016 reinforces the reality of this threat, explaining that, “Other nation states are exploiting
cyberspace for their own economic benefit or strategic advantage. Cyber attack for strategic
reasons is more subtle and is focused on gaining access and control of key assets. For example,
Russia and China have compromised vital cyber systems in Canadian critical infrastructure,
placing the safety and security of Canadians at risk.”158 In addition to the clear strategic threat
Chinese cyber activities pose to the availability and integrity of networks and information
systems supporting essential services in Canada, it is also important to identify the unique
challenges the Russian government and their contracted affiliates are creating for Ottawa’s
infrastructure cybersecurity policies.
A useful example to demonstrate the extent of Russia’s infiltration and presence within
Canada’s critical infrastructure IT environments relates to an extended hacking campaign
involving several breaches across the shared U.S.-Canada electrical grid in 2017. CSE had
alerted partners at DHS’s ICS-CERT to the breaches, which then led to the U.S. Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) releasing attack TTPs and indicators of compromise
(IOC) to help organizations servicing the grid tailor their defenses.159 The CISA bulletin
describing the computer network attacks notes that, “DHS and FBI characterize this activity as a
multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber actors who targeted small
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commercial facilities’ networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, and
gained remote access into energy sector networks.”160 Although the Russian activities during this
extended period were primarily targeting U.S.-based utility and power generating
organizations—including nuclear facilities according to the CERT report—the risk of a
disruptive event surging across Canada’s electrical grid prompted CSE to classify the incident as
a direct threat to the country’s infrastructure.161 At the time of the compromises, Jonathan
Homer, chief of the ICS group at DHS's Hunt and Incident Response Team, stated that, “The
threat actor had a level of access to be able to cause change, to be able to cause impact to the
physical elements of this control system. They got to the point that they could turn the switches,
but they didn't.”162 The strategic opportunities Russia gains by infiltrating the electrical grid and
other critical infrastructure systems within Canada and in allied countries provides Moscow with
a flexible, damaging and direct tool for supporting their geopolitical interests and pressuring their
perceived adversaries into undesired decisions or actions.
As outlined in the second chapter, where Ontario’s electrical grid was analyzed as a case
study for sector breadth and complexity, Canada and the U.S. share a highly interconnected bulk
power system. This includes an overlap of federal, state/ provincial, and regional government
regulators in addition to thousands of private vendors servicing and sometimes operating the
infrastructure across the border. The 2016 “Joint United States-Canada Electric Grid Security
and Resilience Strategy” reinforces this point by noting, “Isolated or complex events with
cascading effects that take place in either country can have major consequences for both the
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United States’ and Canada’s electric grids and adversely affect national security, economic
stability, and public health and safety.”163 Although the majority of targeted organizations during
the 2017 campaign were based in the U.S., with only some Canadian enterprises being impacted,
the Russia-electrical grid example clearly demonstrates the advanced capabilities of Moscow’s
most elite hackers in addition to the vulnerabilities residing inside Canadian infrastructure IT
systems. Further, it also shows Russia’s willingness to leverage cyberspace as a tool during
peacetime to locate new attack opportunities or to occupy their adversary’s limited cybersecurity
incident response resources. This event supports the idea that adversaries are compromising
networks and information systems vital to the country’s security and safety while relations are
peaceful. By routinely targeting ICS and SCADA equipment in addition to other essential nonindustrial IT equipment, Moscow has indicted that cyberspace is not just an environment for IP
theft or financial crime, but also for military posture and security projection.
At the 2017 Reuters Cyber Security Summit in Toronto, Scott Jones, an assistant deputy
minister at CSE, stated that, “Targeted attacks on Canadian infrastructure is something we are
really worried about.”164 During additional remarks after the event he explained how at least 60
nations currently have the ability to conduct offensive cyber warfare operations, which included
ones that could harm the electrical, nuclear, aviation, financial and manufacturing infrastructure
of the country. Among the most elite hackers threatening Canada from a geopolitical motivation
and capability standpoint is North Korea. Pyongyang’s cyber activities and routine espionage
campaigns against critical infrastructure are frequent and complex within Canada and in allied
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countries—particularly South Korea, the U.S. and Japan.165 However, in some cases, Canada has
been uniquely selected as a target, resulting in APT groups closely linked with the North Korean
government compromising information systems supporting regional critical infrastructures. For
example, in 2018, Ontario’s provincial transit authority—called Metrolinx—announced that a
group associated with North Korean security agencies had breached their network.166 At the
time, Public Affairs Manager Anne Marie Aikins stated that after provincial authorities provided
red teaming assistance and incident response analysis, it was clear that a nation-state was
involved and that there was sufficient evidence to attribute the attack to North Korean
individuals. Reports on the incident note that while there was no public safety risk, as critical
systems supporting provincial commercial and passenger railways were not impacted, the ability
for this group to deploy an APT and escalate their attack to control systems would have been
possible with more time.167
Foreign Ministers and representatives of 20 countries from across the world met in
Vancouver, British Columbia a week before the Metrolinx incident to discuss nuclear and
ballistic missile proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. A joint statement led by the Canadian and
U.S. officials at the meeting explicitly stated that, “North Korean cyber-attacks and other
malicious cyber activities pose a risk to critical infrastructure in countries around the world and
to the global economy.”168 Only a week later North Korea launched the operation against
Metrolinx, which not only indicates a potential geopolitical motivation for the attack, but it also
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demonstrates how Pyongyang could have induced an infrastructure availability or safety issue for
an entity overseeing the transport of nearly 70 million Canadian passengers annually169. The
physical threat to the country and the possible secondary and tertiary economic effects such an
attack could have posed highlights the active national security risk to Canada stemming from
nation-state hackers and their associated APT groups.
According to the “Horizontal Evaluation of Canada's Cyber Security Strategy” report
released in 2017 by Public Safety Canada, there were more than 2,500 state-sponsored cyber
campaigns launched against core national networks between 2013 and 2015—at federal,
provincial, private and infrastructure levels.170 These statistics in addition to the examples
provided in this section highlight how foreign adversaries have operationalized cyberspace as a
tool to conduct malicious activity during peacetime and to create opportunities for strategic
attacks during conflict or hostile political relations. Although this section did not specifically
focus on the developments occurring in Canada related to tactical cyber operations at theater or
unit levels in the military, it is important to note that these local combat components of cyber
warfare—and the increasingly related cyber-electronic warfare convergence—are not directly
challenges for the civil safety and prosperity of Canada. This raises a key issue surrounding the
discussion of cyber warfare, as it involves numerous activities that occur during peacetime and
outside of the traditional scope of military doctrine. However, as foreign adversaries continue to
leverage cyberspace as a medium to threaten the integrity and availability of Canada’s critical
infrastructure environment—which in many ways directly supports the CAF—there will be an
increasingly important domestic role for the Canadian forces. This will include defending
national systems and supporting federal agencies with incident response, in addition to their
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more indigenous responsibilities of developing and fielding tactical cyber capabilities to enable
the military in warfighting and digitally contested environments.
Ultimately, state-sponsored cyber espionage and attack occurring throughout Canada’s
industrial and non-industrial sectors will continue to increase in volume and sophistication due to
the strategic priority adversaries have placed on compromising infrastructure assets. While
offensive exploit technologies proliferate globally and countries such as Iran and China continue
funding and developing advanced capabilities, Canada’s government and private sector will need
to employ an even greater amount of resources to offset national infrastructure becoming more
reliant on Internet-connected systems.

Cyber Terrorism and Hacktivism
Although the most advanced cyber threats facing Canada and its allies stem from nationstates and their associated APT groups, there is also an active and growing risk developing from
foreign and domestic terrorist actors. Whether operating as a group or individually, these actors
have identified critical infrastructure in Canada as a key target for achieving political
objectives—using both physical and digital means. In addition to threats from terrorism, there is
also the rising trend of hacktivism, which Deloitte’s Threat and Analytics Team describes as,
“The act of carrying out malicious cyber activity to promote a political agenda, religious belief,
or social ideology.”171 It is sometimes difficult to conceptually differentiate hacktivists and
terrorists, as their motivations may have similar socio-political end objectives, such as violent
environmental activist groups targeting a power plant for its environmental impact and a terror
group targeting the same plant to impact public safety.
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Traditional definitions of terrorism and activism do not always apply clearly in cyber
domain, though it can generally be held that terrorism leverages violence whereas hacktivism
leverages financial, social, political or reputational inconvenience.172 173 However, as previously
noted, traditional approaches to these different threat actors are not always accurate. For
example, there are many instances of terror groups using cyberspace for non-physical and nonlife threatening activities—such as Hamas’ use of computer network exploitation to send fake
propaganda messages to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) personnel—or hacktivist groups inducing a
physical impact—such as the hacking group Anonymous causing delays at Boston Children
Hospital in 2014 as a response to a medical abuse case.174 175 Although these types of incidents
demonstrate an aspect of hacktivism and cyber terrorism convergence, this section will highlight
how there are still significant distinctions, particularly in the context of labeling cyber threat
actors and evaluating IT risk levels for Canada’s critical infrastructure.
The threat posed by terrorist actors has traditionally been physical, where strong
perimeter security and external physical countermeasures meant strong protection of vital
systems and assets. However, the growing reliance of Canada’s national infrastructure on
cyberspace has provided international terror groups and their affiliates with new attack vectors.
The 2012 CSIS document titled “Assessing Cyber Threats To Canadian Infrastructure” notes
that, “Although the Energy, Transport and Finance sectors have long been attractive targets in
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terms of physical attacks, there are now growing concerns that Islamists will use the Internet to
launch cyber attacks to promote their so-called economic jihad. Al-Qaeda has called explicitly
for a cyber jihad alongside other terror operations, while certain Islamic scholars have affirmed
the religious legitimacy of electronic jihad.”176 The following year, Public Safety released their
2013 “Building Resilience Against Terrorism” strategy, which highlighted that, “Terrorist groups
have expressed interest in developing the capabilities for computer based attacks against critical
infrastructure.”177 These points reinforce the existence of a digital threat to infrastructure safety
and integrity stemming from international terror groups and their domestic supporters in Canada.
It is also important to note that while Islamist-linked groups may be recognized as the
most direct and active terror threat in Canada, the “Building Resilience Against Terrorism”
strategy also notes that other actors with different religious and/ or political motivations are also
an ongoing challenge for national security policy. For example, the strategy outlines that, “The
threat posed by violent Sunni Islamist extremists may be Canada’s most pressing concern, but
Canada faces a broad range of international and domestic terrorist threats.” Within the domesticbased threat section of the document, it references the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the
2011 Norway shooting as major terror events where Islamist actors were not involved in the
attack and where attribution was officially assigned to a domestic perpetrator.178
Recognizing the prospect of a domestic-based cyber terrorist is particularly important
because there is substantial educational and technical resources available in Canada that are
traditionally unavailable in foreign countries where many international terror threats reside. For
example, a 2018 National Post article outlined how a Canadian foreign fighter who had travelled
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to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was supporting the group’s
increasingly sophisticated cyber operations.179 The hacker had been involved in computer
network attacks targeting the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), airports and international
media outlets—in addition to hacking online bank accounts to steal money to support ISIS
recruitment and operational activities.180 This individual also developed relatively advanced
computer security tools for the terror organization to protect its online information from allied
intelligence efforts and to preserve and mask its social media accounts.
According to translations from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), the
Canadian hacker eventually became a senior specialist operating under the so-called Caliphate
Cyber Army, which released a public statement in 2018 referring to the individual as a, “Gifted
computer programmer.”181 Although cyberspace enables threat actors to conduct attacks from
distant and remote areas, Canadian security agencies and private-public stakeholders need to
prepare for a doctrinal shift in ISIS and other international terror group thinking as foreign
fighters begin to return home from battlefields in the Middle East, North Africa and South East
Asia. For example, the 2018 Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness “Public
Report on the Terrorism Threat To Canada” highlights that, “The number of extremist travellers
with Canadian connections abroad remains stable at roughly 190. Close to 60 people suspected
of engaging in extremist activities abroad have returned to Canada.”182 While being back in
Canada does not necessarily improve their capacity to conduct malicious cyber activity, it does
mean that their target scope will narrow and possibly lead to the targeting of Canada’s vital
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national systems both physically and digitally. Whether a given terrorist actor has an advanced
know-how in computer science, networking or IT systems, or whether they resort to recruiting or
providing a finical incentive for a computer expert to launch or develop a piece of malware for
them, the risk to infrastructure from terrorist threats in terms of motive, intent and capability are
simultaneously growing. Combining these trends with the Canadian hacker example outlined in
the National Post article reinforces the prospect of a domestic or internationally linked cyber
terrorist adversely affecting the safety, availability or integrity of a critical infrastructure asset in
Canada.
While the motivations and interests of terror groups seeking to exploit cyber
vulnerabilities are clear, it is important to evaluate the actual capabilities of these actors to gauge
the level of risk facing Canada. The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel noted
in a 2018 report that members of ISIS were attempting to develop cyber capabilities and
operational procedures for conducting critical infrastructure attacks.183 This report comes six
years after Canada’s 2012 critical infrastructure cyber assessment, which explained that U.S.
officials, “Commenting on the IT capabilities of Islamist terrorist groups, have admitted that they
underestimated the time al-Qaeda had spent mapping vulnerabilities. American authorities
reportedly detected operatives using telecom switches in several countries, including Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan, to explore digital systems that control U.S. nuclear power plants,
emergency telephone services, and water storage and distribution.”184 Canada’s 2018 National
Cyber Security Strategy also highlights that, “Terrorist organizations are also interested in
acquiring advanced cyber tools to conduct attacks,” although it adds that these groups are not as
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capable of nation-state actors and their objectives are generally different in scope.185 While these
points indicate a growing technical foundation among terrorist organizations, it reinforces their
current inferiority to the more complex and persistent risks facing Canadian infrastructure sectors
from government or state-linked APT groups.
This lack of capability was also highlighted in a 2017 U.S. National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) report, which explained that the majority of ISIS cyber activities are localized,
targeted at regional actors and involve primarily open-source exploit kits with little indigenous
technical development. The report refers to their activities as, “Low-level,” but notes that, “We
need to anticipate that ISIS will move aggressively to develop increased competency in the
cybersphere.”186 Even though ISIS and other international terror groups are placing a priority on
developing offensive cyber expertise and tools—often with an emphasis on critical infrastructure
targets—their current technical threat is simply not comparable to the TTPs or code elegance and
sophistication of nation-states.
In 2012, the FBI arrested Jeremy Hammond, an individual who operated as part of the
hacktivist group Anonymous. The arrest was officially classified as a terrorist-related
investigation according to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS),
whose documents on the arrest indicate that Hammond and the group were on the multi-agency
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) with other well-known terrorist organizations—including
Colombia’s leftist FARC movement, al-Qaeda and the Somalia-based extremists al-Shabaab.187
While this example highlights how one of Canada’s closest allies recognizes the convergence of
hacktivism and cyber terrorism, there are still distinct characteristics that separate the two threat
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actor categories. For example, Gabriella Coleman, who is an international expert on Anonymous
from Canada’s McGill University, while discussing hacktivist threats to national infrastructure
stated that, “I don’t think Anonymous is a threat. They’re not there to kill people. And I’m not so
sure they have the capabilities for that either.”188 These comments provide insights on the sociopolitical scope of a traditional hacktivist mandate, which does not include any type of cyber
operation aiming to induce serious physical or safety damage to the average Canadian or
Canadian business. Based on this key distinction, hacktivist actors should generally be excluded
from the classification of a key threat under federal, provincial, local or private cybersecurity
policies aiming to protect industrial critical infrastructure from failure-based attacks—though
hacktivist threats to non-industrial sectors, such as the financial system, remain significant.189
Conversely, since the mandate of terrorist groups would specifically call for catastrophic cyber
attacks on national targets, where an opportunity to hurt the public interest would be viewed as a
strategic opportunity, terror groups and their cyber activity need to be closely monitored by
every sector as an active risk.
Although hacktivists will generally refrain from targeting critical infrastructure to cause
strategic safety risks to Canadians—such as power plants or hospital targets—this does not mean
that there is no threat to national security stemming from their activities. For example, other
groups such as LulzSec and WikiLeaks have stolen and publically released large amounts of
classified data from governments and sold sensitive corporate information on black markets.190
The Vault 7 data dump reinforces this threat, as the documents that were stolen by hacktivists
and released through WikiLeaks revealed technical details on many Central Intelligence Agency
188

Jordan Press, “Anonymous A Threat To Critical Infrastructure? Expert Says No,” News National, December
20, 2012, https://o.canada.com/news/anonymous-a-threat-to-critical-infrastructure-expert-says-no.
189
Ibid.
190
Parmy Olson, “Inside LulzSec: How The Superstar Hackers Met Wikileaks,” Gawker, May 30, 2012,
https://gawker.com/5914045/inside-lulzsec-how-the-superstar-hackers-met-wikileaks.

71

exploits used for communication eavesdropping and circumventing encryption for data in transit
on mobile devices.191 Canada’s CSE also commented in 2017 that they were preparing for,
“Multiple hacktivist groups [to] deploy cyber capabilities in an attempt to influence the
democratic process in 2019,” which was in reference to Canada’s upcoming federal election.192
Additional hacktivist activities were successful in 2015, when several federal government
websites were targeted by denial-of-service operations and subsequently taken offline.193
Although these types of threats and actors are challenges for Canada’s cybersecurity at-large and
Ottawa’s approach to national security in cyberspace, they are generally outside the realm of
direct strategic risks to the integrity and availability of the country’s infrastructure IT systems.
The last consideration for this section’s threat actor assessment relates to outsourcing and
technology proliferation. As the tools used for offensive cyber activity continue to proliferate,
and as educational resources become more commonplace via Internet-enabled courses and
programs, terror and hacktivist actors will have more resources to support their objectives and
for developing indigenous capabilities. The Ashiyane Digital Security Team, also referred to as
Ashiyane or NEST, is a useful example for demonstrating the rapidly changing educational
landscape surrounding hacking.194 Ashiyane is a unique actor within Iran’s private hacking
community who generally maintains a close relationship with the government—particularly the
IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence.
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In addition to the basic malicious activity the group conducts, such as localized denial-ofservice attacks or social media hijacking, they also act as one of the largest online educational
and training resources for the hacking and computer security community in Iran.195 For example,
members of Ashiyane have taught at hackathons and security conferences in Iran as keynote
speakers. During these events, members of the group review TTPs for DDoS operations, Linux
server infiltration and SQL Injection attacks. As of 2017, there were allegedly 363,949 unique
members participating in the group’s online tutorials, which ranged from instructional videos and
interactive labs focusing on Privilege Escalation, Access Control, OS Analysis and Scanning,
Network Management and Infiltration, Cryptography, Email Security and Remote Access Trojan
(RAT) Development.196 The group has also directly provided technical know-how to regional
terror groups seeking to expand their cyber capabilities, such as the closely linked Iranian
affiliate Hezbollah.197 These types of open-source education resources combined with the ability
to buy commercial-off-the-shelf exploit kits and malware products are allowing terror groups and
their domestic partners in addition to hacktivists around the world to increase their cyber
proficiency.
When access to educational resources and the purchasing of exploit technology is
unsuitable, as the group may not understand its code or components, an opportunity exists to pay
or ideologically recruit a third-party hacker. For example, in 2015, John Riggi, a section chief at
the FBI's cyber division, explained to an industry gathering of energy firms that, “The Islamic
State is trying to hack U.S. power companies,” however, he added that the terrorist group has,
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“Strong intent. Thankfully, low capability. But the concern is that they'll buy that capability.”198
Similar remarks were made in a report written by Scott Stewart, Vice President (VP) of Tactical
Analysis at Stratfor, who outlined that, “A terrorist group doesn't need to develop the malware
for a hack itself. It can buy malware from a commercial hacking crew and then repurpose it for a
more malicious purpose than simply stealing. State sponsorship is also a potential way for
terrorist actors to gain access to malware tools for asymmetrical cyber terrorism.”199 These
alternative methods for terrorist and hacktivist groups to acquire the capability to conduct
advanced cyber attacks is extremely difficult from a proactive mitigation standpoint since a
given actor’s capability or damage potential can dramatically increase in a short period of time
and with little warning. While the ideological aim of most hacktivist groups largely removes
them from the discussion on strategic attacks against critical infrastructure in Canada, terror
groups, particularly those who have already demonstrated intent and capability to launch or
acquire complex exploit technologies, will continue to become a growing risk to industrial and
non-industrial IT systems supporting Canada’s vital systems.

Insider Threats: Foreign Espionage To Accidental IT Disruptions
As outlined in the first section of this chapter where nation-state threats to Canada’s
critical infrastructure were analyzed, government-linked cyber espionage is often associated with
an APT-type of operation. The actor slowly scans a network, escalating privileges and locating
additional vulnerabilities or vital systems to compromise in the future for strategic purposes.
Governments and terror groups, and even hacktivists, can leverage an employee at an
organization to facilitate their malicious objectives. For example, an individual who is recruited
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by a foreign intelligence agency—perhaps for monetary benefits—may attach a malicious USB
to an unsecure port or intentionally open a malicious file on a secure endpoint that already has
authorized access to an organization’s network. Similarly, an employee or a contractor servicing
an organization may have ideological beliefs that lead him/her to sympathize with an activist or
terrorist group who may then use the individual as a mechanism for gaining access to a secure
network or an important information system. In very dangerous scenarios, the internal employee
or contractor may even be a member of the IT or cybersecurity staff, which would potentially
provide the threat actor with administrative or root access and the ability to hinder incident
response by masking log or security metrics. These collective security challenges are called
insider threats, which the 2018 “National Cyber Security Strategy” defines as, “A malicious
threat to an organization that comes from people within the organization, such as employees,
former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning
the organization’s security practices, data and computer systems.”200
In addition to being associated with a third party threat actor, such as a foreign
government, terror group or hacktivist organization, an insider threat can also be a disgruntled
skilled programmer or technician who is seeking revenge on his/her employer and has a strong
understanding of the organization’s IT systems and networks. Conversely, there can also be IT
accidents caused by maintenance or negligent patching mistakes, or even an unintended abuse of
a system’s function. When all of these risks are aggregated, it becomes clear that insider threats
have the potential to directly cause or facilitate major disruptions to the cyber assets supporting
Canada’s critical infrastructure.
The 2017 Global Threat Intelligence Center (GTIC) quarterly report from NTT Security,
an internationally renowned cybersecurity consultancy, reveals that, “Approximately 25% of
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insider threats are hostile with the remaining 75% due to accidental or negligent activity. Even in
organizations that have well-defined incident response plans, they often don’t provide adequate
remediation provisions for insider breaches, leaving the organization less prepared to react
quickly.”201 This report highlights that the insider threat is complex and difficult to mitigate
considering most of the time there is not even an actor motivation for the cybersecurity staff to
take into account when tailoring detection, protection and response measures. A 2018 speech by
CSIS Director David Vigneault also emphasizes the magnitude of this threat by detailing how
foreign governments are increasingly targeting organizations dealing in high-tech and critical
infrastructure sectors with malicious insiders. For example, nation-state actors are interested in
stealing the IP from Canada’s leading IT and security vendors to assist the business development
of their domestic state-owned enterprises, but also to reverse engineer the stolen technology to
help guide their hacking teams towards vulnerabilities in already deployed software and
hardware assets servicing Canada’s infrastructure.202
At the same 2018 speech, Vigneault noted that, “No matter how it's done or who's behind
it, economic espionage represents a long-term threat to Canada's economy and to our prosperity.
CSIS already has seen a trend emerging of state-sponsored espionage in fields like A.I., quantum
technology, 5G wireless technology, biopharmaceuticals and low-carbon technology.”203 While
it is clear that state-linked insider threats enabling both physical and cyber espionage for
commercial or intelligence purposes is a strategic concern for Canada, there are many industries
and corporate sectors impacted by this threat that are out of the scope of critical infrastructure
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security. For example, IP theft of pharmaceuticals could impact the financial and social
wellbeing of Canadians and Canadian business in the long-term, but this threat is incomparable
to the immediate safety and strategic consequences a cyber attack on the hospital infrastructure
of the country could induce—as seen with the WannaCry ransomware virus which will be
analyzed in the following chapter.
Another example of cyber and physical-enabled insider threats posing a risk to national
security but having little direct impact on critical infrastructure relates to a CSE briefing in 2013.
The briefing references a new training program for employees on insider threats, which was
partially in response to increased foreign intelligence activity but also a countermeasure against
incidents such as the 2012 Edward Snowden leaks.204 CSE released a comment in response to the
media acquiring the briefing notes, which read, “CSE provides continuous security education and
training to staff, which includes increasing staff awareness of insider threat issues.” This
comment came after it was revealed that in addition to the education improvements, the agency
was also implementing a five-year $45 million USD upgrade of its Top Secret (TS)
communications network—specifically as an information security control (referring to a Data
Loss Prevention [DLP] program) to prevent insiders from conducting large data exfiltrations.205
While Vigneault’s comments and the CSE insider briefings highlight the economic and
general national security consequences insider threat-related cybercrime, stolen intelligence and
IP theft can cause, a 2016 Public Safety Canada report reinforces the key strategic differences
insider risks pose in a critical infrastructure context. The Star media outlet, which provided the
first public commentary on the report noted that, “Federal officials have quietly warned operators
of electrical grids, transportation hubs and other key infrastructure of the cyber threat from
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insiders who could unleash devastating viruses and cripple systems.” The report itself states that,
“Crucial networks that Canadians rely on for everyday needs face a substantial threat from rogue
employees out to wreak digital havoc.” These comments emphasize the national security and
public resiliency risks malicious and non-malicious insider threats continue to pose within the
infrastructure environment. Protecting against IP theft and other cybersecurity issues should be a
priority for the federal and provincial governments, but these risks are largely centered on
individual incidents and organizations at the commercial level compared to the infrastructure risk
which is often centered on a national economic and public safety level.
To demonstrate the severity of a malicious insider threat, it is worth discussing an
example from a Dallas, Texas (U.S.) hospital that was the target of a cybersecurity incident in
2009.206 A disgruntled issue-driven security guard, who worked at the hospital and had some
background in computer security, downloaded malware onto a mobile media device and brought
it with him to work. Upon arrival, the employee connected the device to dozens of machines with
patient records. He also attempted to upload a specialized malware program enabling remote
interactive control to the IT assets connected to the hospital’s heating, ventilation, and cooling
(HVAC) systems, which if compromised could have spoiled refrigerated pharmaceutical drugs
and stressed many patients’ physical health.207 This example is an ideal demonstration of how an
insider threat—regardless of motivation—can leverage his/her physical access privileges to
enable a network breach and possibly cause a severe cybersecurity incident.
A different example that relates to current geopolitical and national security policy issues
is the risk of a terror organization recruiting or embedding insider threats across critical
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infrastructure sectors in Canada. The 2012 “Assessing Cyber Threats To Canadian
Infrastructure” report published by CSIS has a section dedicated to insider threats and the
prospect of cyber terrorism in Canada. The section explains that, “Infrastructure sectors and
institutions in various jurisdictions that are known to have experienced insider threats from
international jihadist elements in recent years include airports, airlines, energy utilities, nuclear
plants, petroleum companies, university laboratories, water systems, sensitive government
departments and security agencies in Denmark, the Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S.”208 Each
of these close political and security allies of Canada has clearly experienced a terror-related
insider threat scenario, indicating that the risk to infrastructure across Canada is active or simply
not widely reported on due to government classifications preventing open-source exposure or the
lack of information-sharing among sector stakeholders. This lack of information and reporting of
insider threats throughout critical infrastructure is a serious challenge, which the report clearly
outlines by stating that, “Rarely is open-source information available on manifest insider threats,
since organizations tend to be reticent about any such matters for reputational reasons.”209
Nevertheless, certain U.S. intelligence reports for DHS provide insight into cases
involving insider threats associated with terror groups targeting critical infrastructure sectors. An
unclassified 2011 document titled “Insider Threat to Utilities” from the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis states that there have been, “Recent incidents involving physical and
cyber insider attacks” across energy-based critical infrastructure and that, “Violent extremists
have, in fact, obtained insider positions.”210 The report also explains how, “Disgruntled current
and former utility-sector employees have successfully used their insider knowledge to damage
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facilities and disrupt site operations.”211 Not only is this example demonstrative of the ongoing
risk of insiders to cybersecurity programs in Canada and in allied countries, but since the utility
sector is particularly prevalent in cross-border operations, these specific incidents may have
actually represented a direct threat to Canadians and Canadian businesses.
The DHS report also highlights an example in the mid-2000s where a third party vendor
with political and ideological sympathies for al-Qaeda was providing engineering maintenance at
five different U.S.-based nuclear power plants.212 The individual, who would later be arrested in
2010 by security forces in Yemen during a raid on regional al-Qaeda cell, was able to pass
federal background checks and have access to IT systems at the plants from 2002 to 2008. Not
only does this U.S. example among the others highlighted in this section reinforce the insider
cyber threat to critical services and systems in Canada, but recent survey statistics from the
private sector also reflect a growing concern of privileged insiders. A 2018 study from
Cybersecurity Insiders and Crowd Research Partners titled “Insider Threat Report” asked over
450 IT security professionals working in government, private industry and critical infrastructure
sectors their opinions on the growing risk of insider threats.213 The survey indicates that, “90% of
organizations feel vulnerable to insider attacks. The main enabling risk factors include too many
users with excessive access privileges (37%), an increasing number of devices with access to
sensitive data (36%), and the increasing complexity of information technology (35%).” While
the vast majority of professionals recognized the threat, close to 53% actually confirmed insider
attacks against their organization in the previous 12 months.
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A follow-up assessment from IT World Canada on the “Insider Threat Report”, which
included a discussion with Robert Marti, director of privileged access management with CA
Technologies, specifically outlined that organizations in Canada have strong security measures
for the network perimeter but little internal defense or response measures for insiders.214 While
commenting on the report, Marti noted that, “The findings show that an equal amount of
attention is needed to deal with outside threats, malicious inside threats and accidental inside
threats.”215 These comments and the figures from the report emphasize the need for insider
threats to be recognized as a strategic challenge within Canada’s critical infrastructure
cybersecurity policies. Whether the threat is linked to a nation-state’s geopolitical interests, a
disgruntled an employee who is fired and somehow retains his user account privileges, a
hacktivist supporting a civil cause, a terror group recruiting an employee to disrupt a system or
upload malware or even IT contractors who make accidental or negligent mistakes, the risk of
insiders enabling or directly conducting a cyber attack on essential infrastructure operations
poses an active safety and national security risk to Canadians. Consequently, the country’s future
cybersecurity authorities overseeing and auditing critical infrastructure operators and owners
needs to ensure adequate controls are in place to mitigate the insider threat ecosystem.
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THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CYBER ATTACKS ON CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE

The previous chapters have highlighted how there are unique and active vulnerabilities
within industrial and non-industrial critical infrastructure IT systems across Canada in addition to
there being a range of threat actors seeking to exploit these vulnerabilities. However, during a
2017 cybersecurity summit in Toronto, Scott Jones, a former assistant deputy minister at CSE,
reinforced the fact that Canada has, “Yet to suffer a massive critical infrastructure attack and
we’ve yet to suffer a massive loss of [sector] capability.”216 Since Canada faces vulnerabilities
and threats but has not yet been the target of a successful large-scale cyber attack on critical
infrastructure, this chapter will have to rely on past cyber attacks and incidents that have
occurred in adversarial and allied countries around the world to highlight the consequences of
failing to mitigate strategic cybersecurity risks.
Key events that this chapter will review will be the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015,
the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet computer worm targeting Iranian nuclear infrastructure in 2010 and the
WannaCry impact on Britain’s National Health Service (NHS) in 2017. Although these examples
are instances of successful attacks, there are numerous other examples where compromises occur
but attacks were either stopped by network security teams before reaching full potential or the
threat actor was simply not aiming to maximize damage in infected IT systems. For example,
between 2010 and 2015, DHS’s ICS-CERT saw a 640% increase in the number of cases where
industrial IT systems were in some way compromised.217 The majority of these incidents were
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remediated with no impact on organizational or infrastructure uptime requirements, which
reinforces the strategic difference between a compromise and an actual successful disruptive
attack. This trend is also reflective of the attack rate in Canada, where infrastructure sectors have
routinely suffered compromises—such as the North Korea incident with Ontario’s Transit
Authority—but no actual disruptive activities on essential service operations ensued.
The general purpose of this chapter is to analyze a few examples of how technical
vulnerabilities in industrial and non-industrial sectors combined with a motivated threat actor can
result in an infrastructure cybersecurity failure that harms public interests and adversely impacts
national security. Each example will draw on vulnerabilities and threat actor typologies outlined
in previous chapters.

Ukraine Electrical Grid Shutdown, 2015
On December 23, 2015, temporary malfunctions throughout the electrical grids in three
Ukrainian provinces resulted in power outages that lasted up to six hours and affected 225,000
customers—including government offices, businesses and private residences.218 After extensive
digital forensic investigations and root-cause analysis, asset owners and government officials
recognized that the malfunctions were actually the result of a comprehensive cyber attack.
Subsequent investigations would indicate that Russian intelligence groups and associated APT
actors were responsible for the incident, though official attribution remains contested.219 As
many sources indicate, this attack was the first event where a successful cyber-induced operation
218
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disrupted a national electric power grid.220 These disruptions were financially costly for regional
businesses and government offices and forced the utility companies to undergo extensive IT
repairs, including the re-uploading of authentic code to compromised software systems and the
physical replacement of destroyed hardware assets.221 From a more strategic standpoint, the
attack highlighted the consequences a cyber attack on critical infrastructure could have on a
general population, as if the power had remained interrupted for longer periods of time their
would have been highly damaging and cascading effects across hospitals, schools, transportation
routes, communications and even the food supply chain.
Beginning in March of 2015, the attackers, imitating as the Ukrainian Energy Ministry,
used spear phishing techniques to send fake attachments to many national electricity provider
offices.222 Employees at three different regional utilities opened the Microsoft attachments that
were in these emails, which actually contained malicious code embedded in the macros of the
files. Once the employees selected to enable the macros, the embedded code automatically
executed and resulted in the installation of Black Energy 3 malware (BE3). The malware
provided the attackers with a temporary remote connection to their command control (C2)
infrastructure, allowing them to extract network reconnaissance data and study it for a period of
at least six months.223 During this analysis phase, the attackers also moved laterally throughout
corporate networks, where they conducted brute force password attacks to compromise domain
controllers and an Active Directory (AD)—providing them with additional user credentials.224
With these credentials and with the traditionally weak authentication procedures on control
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system networks, the attackers were able to establish an encrypted tunnel via a virtual private
network (VPN) directly interfacing with ICS-liked computers.225 These workstations, which
managed and interacted with distributed electrical grid assets and SCADA systems, allowed the
attackers to begin coordinating and planting their primary attack.
Using the stolen credentials from Domain Controllers the attackers were able to access
control networks as authorized users, which made their movements and activities difficult to
detect. With this advantage, the attackers first located the uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
devices that would allow local computers to keep running for a short period of time even after
the attackers took down the primary power source.226 Since the ICS operators and IT staff relied
on the power that was produced by the grid they oversaw, the attackers wanted to ensure that
once the grid was offline the operators would lose both their primary and backup electricity. This
would leave them completely disconnected from their field assets, thereby protecting the
attackers’ ongoing operation. At one of the facilities impacted by the attack, the UPS software
was reconfigured to deactivate itself after the attacker caused the wide-scale outage.227 When the
UPS devices were signaled to provide the backup power, they simply deactivated. Almost all
computer machines and systems in the control environment were subsequently shutdown, which
included downtime for mission-critical data centers and certain back-office IT operations.
Next, the attackers leveraged their authorized presence on control center workstations to
enable remote connections to serial-to-Ethernet field devices located at geographically dispersed
substations.228 The attackers then pushed malicious firmware versions to these devices, which
would ensure that commands from the operators travelling over Ethernet communication
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protocols would not be converted to the serial protocols needed to communicate with PLCs and
local control technologies at the substations. Effectively, this would cut the control center and its
operators off from managing the physical components of their field systems, leading to a
complete disruption of the SCADA architecture.229 Since the attackers had remote interactive
access to compromised control network workstations, they simply began their attack by
commanding more than 50 substations to go offline.230 This was followed by the execution of the
malicious firmware already uploaded to the serial-to-Ethernet convertors, which made the
devices inoperable and unreachable by any employees in the control center aiming to bring the
substations back online. As the primary power outages proliferated and the pre-planned UPS
attack automatically commenced, backup power supply to the control centers also deactivated.
This resulted in data center and corporate IT disruptions at multiple company facilities and made
the operator task of gaining control of their field devices extremely challenging.
Lastly, the attackers used a customized KillDisk malware program to wipe the system
files off of operator workstations, which like the serial-to-Ethernet convertor attacks, made the
computers inoperable.231 KillDisk is essentially a piece of malware that wipes or overwrites data
in important files, which ultimately causes a computer to crash. Rebooting the computer is not an
option because KillDisk also overwrites the master boot data on hard drives. General
management, finance, human resources and a wide-range of ICS servers and devices were
targeted with the malware.232 Although the malware variants and the interruptions to the SCADA
system were the key features of the primary power supply disruption, there were also
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supplemental attacks that contributed to a slow and uncoordinated incident response. For
example, the malicious actors launched a telephony-based denial of service operation targeting
the impacted energy companies and government offices assisting in the response. This leveraged
the same tactics of a DDoS attack on network or application servers but instead aimed to
overload the phone systems to disrupt communication and emergency response efforts. Robert
M. Lee, a former Cyber Warfare Operations Officer for the U.S. Air Force and the co‐founder of
Dragos Security, noted in 2016 that, “It was brilliant. In terms of sophistication, most people
always focus on the malware that’s used in an attack. To me what makes sophistication is
logistics and planning and operations...this was highly sophisticated. What sophisticated actors
do is they put concerted effort into even unlikely scenarios to make sure they’re covering all
aspects of what could go wrong.”233 Lee’s comments highlight the technical challenges such an
intensive and well-planned operation can pose for even well funded and trained cybersecurity
programs in Canada aiming to protect critical infrastructure systems.
Although this incident has a visceral connection to Russia due to the geopolitical
conditions at the time, Lee also stated that, “This had to be a well-funded, well-trained team. But
it didn’t have to be a nation-state.”234 These comments reinforce the trend highlighted in the
previous chapter where APT groups are no longer only associated with governments and that
exploit technology proliferation and wider access to advanced computer security education are
raising the technical profiles of non-state actors. The attack not only provides insight on
technical cyber risks in industrial critical infrastructure sectors but it also highlights how a
potential adversary may employ cyber operations during a period of hybrid hostility or strategic
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conflict. For example, though no official attribution was assigned to the Russian government, it
is worth noting that in the year before the incident Russian paramilitary forces invaded Crimea,
Ukraine and began supporting an armed rebellion in the country’s Eastern provinces—which was
still ongoing during the time of the cyber attack.235
During this conflict, Russian backed security forces leveraged hybrid warfare techniques
to confuse Ukrainian political decision-making processes and to disturb Ukrainian allied military
activities in and near the conflict zone. A report from The Henry M. Jackson School of
International Relations at Washington University details how Russian forces have, “Combined
cyber warfare tactics with traditional strategy to create a new type of hybrid warfare that relies
on proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and to maximize confusion and
uncertainty.”236 This approach to inducing complex conflict environments is consistent with the
timing and sophistication of the power grid attack, further demonstrating how Russia has
leveraged cyberspace as a technical tool for achieving strategic objectives in addition to
supporting geopolitical interests—with limited international legal and political liabilities.
Ukraine is an ally of Canada, and in the year following Russia’s Crimea invasion, the
CAF launched Operation UNIFIER.237 As described by Canada’s Department of National
Defense, UNIFER was created to provide military support to the Security Forces of Ukraine.
This geopolitical context and Canada’s distant involvement in a foreign issue at odds with
Moscow’s interests provides an indication of why and how Canada may be targeted by a similar
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strategic cyber operation in the future—not necessarily by Russian-linked actors, but by any type
of APT group with intent and capability. The prospect of this type of sustained attack on the
same scale of the Ukrainian cyber incident but longer in duration reflects a scenario where
financial, safety, healthcare, communications, transport and numerous other critical
infrastructures would face a cascading disruption impacting Canada’s economy and national
security.

Stuxnet Computer Worm in Iran, 2010
In 2010, Israel and the U.S. launched a malicious computer worm targeting Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure, which at the time and even today has been criticized for supporting a nuclear
weapons development program.238 Although the actors behind this attack are close allies of
Canada, the 2010 operation is a another useful case study for understanding the physical damage
that could occur as a result of industrial IT compromises. Additionally, the attack highlights how
cyberspace can be used as a strategic tool for achieving geopolitical objectives when more
traditional physical, military or political means are not feasible. This point is particularly
important, as the Stuxnet example reflects how the U.S. and Israel leveraged cybersecurity
weaknesses in Iran to specifically slow down or disable key components of the country’s nuclear
development when options such as sanctions and military intervention were either ineffective or
unfeasible. The geopolitical nature of the operation was also evident from Tehran’s response,
which as a result of the incident began laying the foundation of the country’s Cyber Defense
Command and a new cybersecurity unit under the Passive Defense Organization (PDO) to
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protect domestic networks and systems from foreign adversaries.239 240 While the country’s
immediate reactions centered on standing up new defensive capabilities, Iran also increased its
offensive cyber activity—including the use computer-based financial crime and intellectual
property (IP) theft to support the country’s economy and to strategically position themselves
within important adversarial IT systems. Iran, in addition to other countries around the world,
observed the Stuxnet operation as the introduction of a new era in geopolitical competition
requiring the development of new doctrines and tools to pressure foreign competitors in the
digital space.
Stuxnet’s advanced payload utilized four different zero-day exploits affecting Windows
OS and Siemens industrial control software.241 The computer worm was delivered via USB
directly into one of Iran’s primary nuclear enrichment facilities, the Natanz site, which is located
just South of the country’s capital of Tehran.242 The insider who initially connected the USB to a
computer port at the facility is believed to have been a contractor, though it is unclear whether
he/she was acting maliciously or inadvertently. Once connected to the computer, the worm was
uploaded and was immediately able to begin spreading across the control network as the infected
computer was situated directly at an industrial facility already integrated with ICS equipment and
SCADA systems. Stuxnet’s malware utilized at least two stolen digital certificates, which are
traditionally used to cryptographically guarantee the trustworthiness of a piece of software.243
The certificate does this by communicating with an OS that a file has not been tampered with or
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corrupted after its original publisher or author completed its development. If a virus infects a file
after it has been digitally signed then it breaks the digital signature, and an OS such as Windows
would refrain from executing the file. However, if a file is infected and then digitally signed, the
result is a piece of software with embedded malicious code that can be verified as safe for
execution on a computer system. The Stuxnet worm bypassed detection tools by leveraging this
masking technique, which facilitated the spread of malware on ICS devices and nuclear
production equipment at nearly 14 facilities across Iran.244
As Stuxnet replicated itself across the control network, it was searching for Windowsbased equipment that was operating Siemens Step7 industrial software.245 Unique rootkits
allowed the attackers to gain administrator level access to multiple PLCs using these Step7
programs, which then enabled a read and modify function for all communications being sent
from the control center to field equipment—and from field equipment to control center
workstations.246 There were at least three different modules within Stuxnet’s primary attack
sequence, and with the worm using rootkits to embed malicious code directly into parts of the
PLC OS, security controls and detection software at the Iranian facilities were unable to
recognize any abnormal activity. Stuxnet commanded these PLCs to spin the uranium
centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility outside of its normal operating parameters, which
ultimately induced catastrophic damage.247
Briefly, a centrifuge is a piece of equipment that increases the concentration of the active
isotope of uranium, U-235, which is an essential ingredient for both nuclear reactors and nuclear
weapons. By spinning the centrifuges outside of their normal parameters—both too fast and too
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slow multiple times over several months—the U.S.-Israeli worm was able to slowly destroy 984
centrifuges, which was nearly 20% of the entire processing capacity at the Natanz facility.248 The
compromised PLCs relayed inaccurate information to the operators in the control center of the
facility, which indicated normal centrifuge spinning speeds when in reality they were slowly
incurring damage. This cyber attack set back the Iranian nuclear program at least two years,
inducing significant financial costs for the government and creating challenges for their foreign
policy and regional geopolitical objectives. Although this attack was largely a strategic success
for Canada’s allies, the destructive potential that was demonstrated not only influenced Iran to
accelerate their offensive cyber capability programs but also showed state and non-stat actors
across the world how a cyber weapon could be used for physical effect objectives.249
Kaspersky Lab and Symantec investigations on Stuxnet revealed that the worm’s
presence on Iranian control networks was a result of a USB being compromised at a third party
vendor who provided engineering support to centrifuges across the country.250 Security
researchers noted that the Natanz facility had no known vulnerable Internet connections, stating
that, “The targeting of certain high profile companies was the solution and it was probably
successful.”251 These comments refer to the specific targeting of manufacturers and vendors who
serviced the Natanz site, which included Stuxnet uploads on machines at Neda Industrial Group
and Foolad Technic Engineering Company—who were both involved in industrial automation
software—in addition to other Iranian-based companies such as Mobarakeh Steel Company and
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Behpajooh Electric & Engineering Company. One of the key vendors targeted was Kalaye
Electric, who was the main manufacturer of the Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges.252 The
Kaspersky report states that, “It appears quite reasonable that this organization of all others was
chosen as the first link in the infections chain intended to bring the worm to its ultimate
target.”253 This case study is a useful example of how the vast amount of vendors and third-party
stakeholders supporting critical infrastructure in Canada can be used as an entry point for
damaging malware to reach vital IT systems. Further, since an insider—who was either acting
unknowingly or maliciously—transferred the computer worm via a USB inside the secure
Natanz facility, the example also demonstrates the real impact an insider can pose.
While the threat actors in this example involve two of the most advanced allied cyber
powers in the world, and two governments who pose no strategic risks to Canada, it is still
important to recognize the technical and policy impact of the attack of itself. For example,
Stuxnet’s highly effective code—alike the operation in Ukraine—demonstrates that vulnerable
ICS equipment and control networks can allow an actor to cause significant physical disruptions.
Although the Stuxnet malware was crafted and tested to ensure only certain functionality would
be altered, an untested version with less control and technical specificity could have posed a
much larger radiation-based health risk to nearby civilian populations in Iran.254 255
As of 2017, there were five large nuclear power production facilities in Canada with a
total of 19 reactors in commercial operation, which accounted for close to 20% of total electricity
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demands across the country.256 In 2018, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), Canada’s
premier nuclear science and technology organization, created the National Innovation Center for
Cybersecurity with the intent of improving nuclear and other critical infrastructure cybersecurity
across the country. In a statement on the new Center, CNL explained that, “While there is a large
commercial industry catering to the cyber security of business and information technology
systems, the cyber security of industrial control systems has been widely overlooked. Yet, this
critical sector has shown vulnerabilities, with recent attacks on the Ukraine power grid in 2015
and 2016, a German steel mill in 2014, and the well-known Stuxnet attack in 2010.”257 These
comments reinforce how critical infrastructure stakeholders in Canada view the nearly decadeold Stuxnet attack as a lingering indicator of active cyber risks across industrial IT environments.
The CNL statement in 2018 also explained that, “Every year, the instruments, controls,
and monitors that keep Canada’s most valuable energy assets running smoothly become more
automated. This transformation offers tremendous benefits to Canadians, but it also presents new
risks to the country’s energy grid and other major infrastructure.”258 The Stuxnet and Ukraine
power grid case study that this chapter has reviewed demonstrates the strategic consequences
cybersecurity failures throughout vital industrial IT environments can induce. Not only do these
incidents prove the geopolitical or security utility of infrastructure cyber attacks, but they also
demonstrate the growing trend of threat actors leveraging vulnerabilities in SCADA-linked
assets. Therefore, understanding that a range of different actors with varying levels of technical
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sophistication are actively scanning and planning cyber attacks on Canada’s ICS-dependant
sectors needs to be a core national security priority for the country moving forward.
From a long-term policy perspective, it is worth noting that many government and private
industry cybersecurity stakeholders have disapproved of deploying such an advanced computer
weapon in the wild—noting a potential blowback affect. During a 2011 Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs meeting, President and CEO of the National
Board of Information Security Examiners of the United States, Inc., Michael Assante, stated that,
“The [Stuxnet] worm stands as not only a blueprint for entities sophisticated enough to reproduce
a Stuxnet-like attack—such as Russia or China—but an attacker with less means could still use
parts of the code to wreak less-controlled havoc.”259 A subsequent congressional report
discussing the implications of the Stuxnet attack noted that, “It is widely believed that terrorist
organizations do not currently posses the capability or have not made the necessary arrangements
with technically savvy organizations to develop a Stuxnet-type worm. However, Stuxnet's design
revelations may make it easier for terrorist organizations to develop such capabilities in the
future."260 The damaging impact Stuxnet had on Iranian infrastructure and the technical
capabilities that the U.S and Israel demonstrated to the world not only ushered in the era of
strategic cyber operations, but it also exposed advanced attack know-how for state and non-state
actors to augment their indigenous cyber capabilities. Moving forward, Canada and its allies will
need to be cautious with how and where their offensive cyber activity occurs as once toolkits,
TTPs and code are operationalized in the wild, adversaries—both state and non-state—will have
access to these exploits and may leverage them against friendly assets in the future.
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WannaCry Ransomware Virus and Britain’s Healthcare System, 2017
In May of 2017, a computer virus known as WannaCry was released worldwide
impacting at least 150 countries and causing nearly $4 billion USD in ransomware payment and
IT reimaging, data retrieval and system restoration costs.261 While the WannaCry virus was not
targeted at a specific country or organization, and while its developers were certainly financially
motivated, the virus had a unique strategic impact on Britain where the country’s national
healthcare system experienced serious disruptions. The impact of these disruptions was costly
from a monetary standpoint and threatening to the health and safety of British citizens seeking
treatment at medical facilities across the country. While the Iranian and Ukrainian examples
focus on industrial IT vulnerabilities and cyber attacks, this example will focus on a nonindustrial environment—Britain’s healthcare infrastructure.
WannaCry’s ransomware encrypts data on infected computers and demands a ransom
payment to allow user access. WannaCry made use of an exploit tool that was first developed by
the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which was called EternalBlue.262 This exploitation
tool, among many others, were publically released by a hacking and activist collective known as
The Shadow Brokers on April 14, 2017—just one month before the WannaCry launch.263
EternalBlue allowed the creators of WannaCry to take advantage of vulnerabilities in the
Microsoft Windows implementation of Server Message Block (SMB) protocol.264 SMB protocol
is a standard transport protocol used by Windows machines for a wide variety of purposes such
as file sharing and access to remote Windows services, in addition to generally facilitating
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communication between nodes on a network. The vulnerability in the protocol allows the virus to
execute malicious code on target computers and machines after securing a connection to an
exposed SMB port. Once a machine is successfully infected with the malware, the virus will scan
local networks searching for additional machines with vulnerable SMB ports attempting to
spread its reach.265 The second component of the virus is the ransomware functionality, which
then begins to encrypt a wide range of important files on infected computers and machines,
including Microsoft Office files, system operation files and other sensitive data. WannaCry also
checks targeted computers for a DoublePulsar infection, which is a separate backdoor tool
released in the April by the Shadow Brokers leak that also takes advantage of SMB port
vulnerabilities.266
While Microsoft publically expressed their anger and dissatisfaction with the NSA for
developing an exploit for one of their OS vulnerabilities without informing them of the flaw, the
company had already discovered the vulnerability indigenously and released a patch in March of
2017. This patch was highly effective and most organizations implementing the patch did not
have their Windows systems or machines compromised by WannaCry.267 A report from Britain’s
National Audit Office (NAO) in April 2018 notes that the National Health Service (NHS) and
the Department of Health, “Had issued critical alerts warning organisations to patch their
systems.” The report later adds that before May 2017—which was when WannaCry launched—
NHS and the Department, “Had no formal mechanism for assessing whether local NHS
organisations had complied with their advice and guidance and whether they were prepared for a
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cyber attack.”268 This lack of patch management oversight was catastrophic, as many medical
facilities, providers and organizations throughout the country’s healthcare infrastructure were
still operating on out-dated and vulnerable Windows XP software.
Once the virus began spreading, about 34% of Britain’s regional medical districts—
referred to as Trusts—experienced major disruptions. The NAO report notes that, “In total at
least 81 out of 236 trusts across England were affected. A further 603 primary care and other
NHS organisations were infected by WannaCry, including 595 GP practices.”269 Over a sevenday period, there were at least 19,000 healthcare appointments—including 139 essential cancer
treatments—that were cancelled and at least seven medical districts had to divert urgent care
patients away from hospital emergency departments due to vital IT system lockouts that were
demanding ransom payment.270
Many cybersecurity firms and governments attributed the WannaCry virus to an APT
actor associated with the North Korean government called the Lazarus Group.271 While the actor
was not targeting Britain or national healthcare infrastructure specifically, the virus posed a real
national security risk in terms of financial damage and the possibility of physically impacting the
safety of many citizens. HealthCareCAN, formerly known as the Canadian Healthcare
Association, conducted a member-based survey with hospitals, medical research centers and
universities in May 2017 following WannaCry’s impact on Britain’s NHS. The survey indicated
that, “More than 8 in 10 health leaders said that Canada’s health sector is vulnerable to cyber
attacks. Likewise, 86% of HealthCareCAN members say that their organization has detected a
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breach or narrowly avoided incident.”272 These figures add urgency for developing a more
comprehensive and resilient cybersecurity posture across the Canadian healthcare space and the
non-industrial environment in general, particularly in the context of major events such as
WannaCry. Atty Mashatan, a professor at Ryerson University's School of Information
Technology Management, stated shortly after the launch of WannaCry that, “This time around
we [Canada] were lucky,” adding that, “It was nothing more than a fluke that Canada appears to
have been largely spared from Friday's ransomware attack that disrupted services in Russia, the
U.K., Ukraine, Spain and India.”273
Recognizing the strategic risks associated with a cybersecurity failure in the healthcare
sector demonstrates that strong security and incident response practices in non-industrial
infrastructure environments are equally as important compared to the more physical industrial
sectors, such as water, gas and oil, or electricity. Further, this case study also highlights a useful
example regarding patch management programs across nationwide systems. Not only was a lack
of patching a major cause for WannaCry’s disproportionate impact in Britain, but it was also
highlighted in chapter two where difficulties patching software in the LVTS proved to be an
ongoing source of systemic cyber risk for Canadian banks and the economy. Regardless of the
sector—industrial or non-industrial—ensuring that key owner, operator and regulator
stakeholders conform to adequate cybersecurity standards is the only verifiable approach to
building a more resilient environment for the country’s most important and at risk digital
systems.
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Implications for Canada
Altogether, the three critical infrastructure cyber attacks reviewed in this chapter act as
useful case studies for recognizing how Canada’s national interests could be harmed through
cyber vulnerabilities—both technical and policy-based—being exploited across the country’s
essential service landscape. While Canadian allies and not adversaries orchestrated the Stuxnet
attack, the physical destruction that the operation induced to ICS and SCADA processes
throughout Iranian nuclear infrastructure directly influenced risk perceptions associated with the
integrity and availability of similar technologies and systems operating in Canada. This point
was reinforced by CNL—a key nuclear science and technology organization in Canada
previously referenced in this chapter—who specifically noted the Stuxnet attack as the reason for
launching improved nuclear power cybersecurity initiatives across the country. Further, the same
year of the Stuxnet operation, Canada’s Parliament directly prioritized remediation and
protection against strategic cyber threats to critical infrastructure in a government publication
that stated, “Stuxnet demonstrates the potential for well-resourced cyber-attacks to damage or
destroy critical infrastructures.”274 Regardless of being an operation researched and executed by
allied nations, the threat of Stuxnet’s code proliferation and the recognition by Canadian officials
that similar TTPs could be used on infrastructure targets in Canada reinforces the point that
Stuxnet directly transformed the perceived strategic risk landscape for nationally important IT
systems—particularly those linked to nuclear power facilities.
Similar strategic risks to Canadian infrastructure assets were also realized after the 2015
cyber-induced Ukraine power grid failure. For example, in 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
directed Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale to assess all government operations and
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capabilities to determine whether the country could respond to a similar incident, citing that
potential adversaries could exploit electrical systems in Canada. The issue was further discussed
during a parliamentary committee hearing that same year where Conservative Member of
Parliament (MP) Cheryl Gallant stated that, “The concern is that this type of sophisticated,
planned, synchronized attack could occur in North America,” and that it is important for the
government to, “Make sure that [such] a coordinated attack or perhaps a more sophisticated one
does not impede our electricity system and all the items attached to the grid that we depend
on.”275 Considering a foreign adversary was likely the source of the Ukraine attack and since the
target of the attack was an official Canadian military partner, this incident directly influenced
and educated Ottawa policymakers on the strategic issues surrounding critical infrastructure
cybersecurity. Not only did it highlight the physical impact that a cyber operation could induce,
but it also highlighted how a major event could directly deteriorate economic and security
interests and require a significant amount of time, resources and technical expertise that were not
necessarily available in Canada at the time to conduct a proper recovery. For certain sectors and
organizations in Canada, this unpreparedness remains apparent to date. Gallant’s comments
reinforce the trend of increased risk perception among Canadian officials—including the Prime
Minister—who recognized the Ukraine incident and its technical complexities and geopolitical
fallout as an indication of active and rapidly growing strategic cyber threats to Canadians and
their infrastructure.
The WannaCry case study examined in this chapter also forced the Canadian government
and its private industry partners to internalize the growing threat and likelihood of an actor
exploiting vulnerabilities across the country’s most important assets. This realization was rooted
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in WannaCry ransomware, particularly in the context of Britain’s NHS, having a direct impact
on the physical safety of citizens and the potential to induce a long-term strategic crisis for the
country. Tom Bossert, a Homeland Security Advisor to the White House in 2017 noted that, “It
affected individuals, industry, governments and the consequences were beyond economic. The
computers affected badly in the U.K. in their health care system put lives at risk, not just
money.”276 As noted in the previous section, HealthCareCAN specifically collected industry and
government survey data to reinforce the need for significant improvement of cybersecurity
programs across Canada’s healthcare infrastructure in the aftermath of the virus. Further, since
Canada and its closest allies attributed the WannaCry attack to North Korean security and
intelligence groups—some of which have infiltrated Canadian critical infrastructure IT systems
in the past—there is a clear indication that advanced threat actors interested in targeting Canada
have both the technical capability and political willingness to execute a potentially catastrophic
operation. When the impact of the these three case studies examined in this chapter are
aggregated form a sophistication and financial/ physical damage standpoint, it becomes clear that
the strategic risk facing Canadian and allied critical infrastructure has only continued to increase
and become more challenging to mitigate.
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POLICY-BASED SOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REMIDIATIONS

As the final chapter, the following sections will outline some key technical and policy
solutions that would improve the current state of critical infrastructure cybersecurity in Canada.
While the federal government and private industry have made improvements to their overall
cyber posture in response to the growing sophistication and motivation of threat actors, there are
still security gaps in the programs defending Canada’s vital systems that will need to be
addressed. The general approach that will be outlined in this chapter follows a three-tiered
critical infrastructure cybersecurity strategy implemented by a coordinated public-private
partnership. This chapter will break the three tiers down into individual sections.
The first section will discuss the need for minimum cybersecurity standards to be
implemented and enforced using a framework-based approach, which would include developing
security controls for infrastructure operators, regulators, owners and third parties. The
implementation of these controls would be standardized across the country by using a common
purpose-built Canadian version of the U.S. NIST critical infrastructure framework. This
assessment tool could be constructed and tailored for specific sector needs in Canada as opposed
to simply recommending the highly generic NIST version. The second section will advocate for
government and private sector infrastructure stakeholders to adopt an assumption of compromise
(AoC) culture to create a more proactive and threat-conscious environment for defending
networks and important IT systems. Lastly, the third section will reinforce the need for federal
and provincial governments to increase their communication and interaction with private
stakeholders to ensure critical infrastructure operators and vendors are receiving real-time threat
data. This will not only improve defenses and tailor cybersecurity programs to defend against
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active threats, but it will also ensure that classified but useful information at federal intelligence
agencies gets disseminated to necessary entities in a timely and non-redacted manner. Although
recent developments indicate improvement, such as the first public release of a National Cyber
Threat Assessment in 2018 and the growth of participation in the Canadian Cyber Threat
Exchange (CCTX), this chapter will outline how there are still lingering policy barriers and
challenges that need correcting before Canada’s critical infrastructure systems can become more
digitally secure.

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: A Framework Approach
The overall objective of implementing a minimum cybersecurity standard for all
stakeholders in each of Canada’s ten critical infrastructure sectors is an extremely large and
financially costly objective. Not only will these standards need to be technically different across
sectors, but the risk assessments for different types of IT systems and the varying levels of
private involvement will make the standards incompatible. Conducting oversight of this process
and auditing for compliance purposes would create new administrative difficulties that would
likely hinder this approach from the start.
To counter this challenge, the minimum cybersecurity standard should be implemented in
a framework format where universal policy-based controls that are technology neutral are
developed to help improve posture at all levels of the critical infrastructure industry—which
includes regulators, owners, operators and vendors. By leveraging a universal framework, each
sector would have the opportunity to subsequently narrow the focus of each control to ensure it is
suitable and compatible with industry best practices, procedures and technologies. Developing
one primary framework and requiring that all stakeholders meet a certain level of the

104

framework’s implementation could itself become the national infrastructure cybersecurity
standard. For example, each organization being assessed by the framework might need to meet a
certain average maturity score to be considered as compliant under the standard, and a lack of
compliance can mean fines or exclusion from servicing certain vital assets. This would be a
much more cost, resource and time efficient approach compared to a segmented strategy
focusing on individual sectors specifically. Instead, sectors could take the primary universal
framework and work with government stakeholders, such as CSE, CSIS, CAF and Public Safety
Canada to tailor controls or requirements where needed.
A key benefit of developing this cyber risk management framework is that DHS and
NIST in the U.S. have already produced a comprehensive internationally renowned template that
Canada’s federal authorities could leverage. This template is called the “Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” with the newest version being released in April
of 2018.277 NIST describes their publication as a framework that, “Consists of standards,
guidelines, and best practices to manage cybersecurity-related risk.” More specifically, the
publication notes that the framework’s, “Prioritized, flexible, and cost-effective approach helps
to promote the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure and other sectors important to
the economy and national security.”278 Public Safety Canada has actually endorsed this type of
concept, where a universal Canadian-centric cybersecurity framework could be generally applied
across multiple sectors to assess regulators, owners, operators and vendors. For example, Public
Safety’s 2016 “Fundamentals of Cyber Security for Canada’s Critical Infrastructure Community”
states that the organization officially, “Endorses the NIST Framework and acknowledges the
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relevance and applicability of the Framework in the Canadian context.”279 Additionally, a
January 2017 “Cyber Review Consultations Report” also from Public Safety Canada, specifically
highlighted that, “There are a number of industry standards and/or guidance documents that can
be leveraged to help build an appropriate program...including the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework for Critical Infrastructure.”280 In addition to these references, numerous other Public
Safety, private industry and federal government reports highlight the utility in adopting a tailored
version of the NIST framework as a high-level approach to creating a national infrastructure
cybersecurity standard.
There have already been instances of sectors in Canada tailoring the NIST framework for
their unique technological and operational needs. For example, in 2015, the Investment Industry
Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) released a “Cybersecurity Best Practice Guide” that
refers to NIST’s primary control functions as, “A high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an
organization’s management of cybersecurity risk.”281 The guide then explains that adopting these
functions would provide, “A proven process upon which to establish and manage cybersecurity
program development” for Canada’s FMI.282 Other sectors in addition to finance have also
leveraged the NIST framework as a strategic guidance tool to build-out a more tailored
cybersecurity program. A direct example of this has been the province of Ontario, who in 2017
developed and implemented the “Ontario Cyber Security Framework.”283 The Ontario
framework was developed and coordinated by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), which is the
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regulator and authority responsible for provincial electricity and natural gas production,
distribution, safety and usage.
The OEB launched the framework for the purpose of having a common tool to evaluate
the cybersecurity posture of small gas and electric Local Distribution Companies (LDCs) who
tend to have less comprehensive, structured and official reporting capabilities compared to larger
organizations.284 Instead of requiring these smaller companies to develop their own in-house
assessment capabilities or paying for an outsourced cybersecurity audit, the OEB wanted a
common template that they could apply across the province to any energy distribution
organization to evaluate the province’s overall infrastructure cyber resilience. The OEB explains
that the province’s, “Cyber Security Working Group developed an Ontario distributor and nonbulk transmitter Cyber Security Framework based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”285
The OEB primarily utilized the comprehensive foundation provided in the NIST document as
opposed to developing a completely new approach, which not only saved money and provincial
resources, but also created standardized cybersecurity control criteria that made tracking
improvements and comparing resiliency evaluations between companies easier to understand
over the long-term.286
In addition to the generic criteria listed in the NIST framework, the OEB also combined
security controls and key risk indicators (KRI) created by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE)
into the Ontario Framework to provide more technically focused controls suited for the energy
sector.287 The IIROC and OEB examples are exactly aligned with the policy recommendation

284

Ibid., 3, 5-6.
Ibid., 3.
286
“Ontario’s Cyber Security Framework Is Now In Force,” Association of Power Producers of Ontario, June
2018, https://magazine.appro.org/news/ontario-news/5545-1529540280-ontario’s-cyber-security-framework-is-nowin-force.html.
287
“Ontario Cyber Security Framework,” Ontario Energy Board, 8.
285

107

this section is providing, as in both cases Canadian regulatory bodies leveraged the welldeveloped NIST framework and tailored its content to more appropriately provide cybersecurity
control and maturity assessment criteria as part of a Canadian sector-specific version.
Additionally, the Ontario Framework is also a useful case study in terms of enforcement. For
example, the OEB created a Central Compliance Authority (CCA) to track provincial
implementation of the framework and to conduct routine audits to ensure baseline controls are
being met and that maturity ratings were slowly improving.288 Without having a common
assessment tool, the duties of the CCA would be administratively and technically challenging
because each organization could be using different auditing or evaluation benchmarks and
metrics.
At the federal level, there are also examples of critical infrastructure stakeholders
adopting the NIST framework. In 2018, Health Canada—a federal government Department—
recommended the use of the risk management practices outlined in the NIST publication to offset
growing cybersecurity challenges across the industry ranging from privacy considerations to
major attacks. The announcement states that stakeholders in the healthcare and medical supply
chain sector should leverage the framework, “As a blueprint of best practices to guide their
cybersecurity activities.”289 290 Alike the energy and finance examples highlighted in the
previous paragraphs, Health Canada noted that additional controls unique to the sector should
also be utilized. For example, new cybersecurity challenges arising from medical equipment
being linked to IoT devices are issues not entirely covered in the generic NIST framework.
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Also at the federal level, organizations such as the Canadian Water and Wastewater
Association (CWWA) have recommended national water infrastructure owners and operators to
implement derivatives of the NIST framework. Public and non-profit water system regulators
have all indicated that using the framework can improve sector cybersecurity and create a
standardized model capable of evaluating organizations, companies and vendors across the water
processing and distribution system consistently. A 2017 report from the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Initiative at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada, which was sponsored by
Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC), called for Canadian water sector
stakeholders to implement a guidance document called the “Process Control System Security for
the Water Sector (PCSWS).”291 This document was explicitly created by the American Water
Works Association (AWWA) as a “Voluntary, sector-specific approach for adopting the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework.”292 While the AWWA is not a Canadian-based regulatory or trade
body, the 2017 Halifax study outlines how the CWWA supports the PCSWS approach and
believes its use of the NIST framework can be effective for Canada’s national water sector
stakeholders.293
The industrial and non-industrial examples discussed in this section—including finance,
health, energy and water—clearly highlight the demand for using the NIST framework as a tool
to improve cybersecurity oversight, controls, standardization and common enforcement measures
across individual sectors in Canada. Although there is not yet a Canadian version of the NIST
framework that could be deployed as the official generic cybersecurity assessment tool for the
291

Calvin Burns, Kevin Quigley and Gwendolyn Moncrieff-Gould, “Strengthening The Resilience Of The
Canadian Water Sector,” Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative at Dalhousie University, pg. 133, December
15, 2017, https://www.cwwa.ca/pdf_files/Water_sector_vulnerability_REPORT.pdf.
292
American Water Works Association (AWWA), “Process Control System Security Guidance For The Water
Sector,” AWWA and Water Industry Technical Action Fund (WITAF), October 2014,
http://www.nawc.org/uploads/documents-and-publications/documents/AWWACybersecurityguide.pdf.
293
Burns, “Strengthening The Resilience Of The Canadian Water Sector,” 17-18, 133.

109

country, Public Safety Canada offers a review service that may be useful for developing a future
Canadian-based version. The Department’s Canadian Cyber Resiliency Review (CCRR)
program provides onsite cybersecurity assessments for critical infrastructure organizations based
on, “Scores across the 10 domains of the NIST Cyber Security Framework.”294 The CCRR is
voluntary and only organizations that specifically seek out and ask CSE or Public Safety Canada
for assistance will receive the assessment, but it is worth noting that it is entirely based on
applying the NIST controls and providing maturity ratings based on the framework.295 During
the assessment, Public Safety Canada, along with private sector IT security experts and
individuals from CSE or the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Center (CCIRC), work with
critical infrastructure organizations to conduct a 1-2 day audit of current cybersecurity and risk
management practices. The CCRR goes through the five primary framework functions of
Identify, Detect, Protect, Respond and Recover in addition to assessing the maturity of each
subcategory control within those five functions—which amounts to analyzing 108 controls.296
These controls range from hardware and software asset management, detection processes, system
development lifecycles, business continuity plans, encryption, backups, logging, root cause
analysis and third party risk assessments.
The use of the voluntary CCRR NIST-based assessment tool by Public Safety Canada in
addition to the general demand of NIST framework resources across the country indicates
support for this section’s recommendation of creating a Canadian cybersecurity framework
program to be used by all critical infrastructure stakeholders.297 A key reason for developing a
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framework unique to the Canadian context as opposed to continuing to informally rely on the
U.S. NIST version is that regulatory, legal and reporting structures in Canada are different than
in the U.S. While the NIST framework was intentionally built to be generic enough for wide
consumption across multiple sectors and even countries, a Canadian-based high-level framework
would take into account operational, composition and regulatory features that only exist in
Canada’s critical infrastructure environments. These features can include the distinction of
federal and provincial regulatory duties, data privacy and intelligence sharing laws, or even
cross-sector resiliency collaboration requirements. Although each sector will need to tailor the
framework’s implementation to adjust for different technologies and processes, there are
common issues that every stakeholder will need to address—such as how to formally report
cyber incidents to federal intelligence agencies like the CCIRC—who is Canada’s computer
security incident response team and the main point of contact for critical infrastructure
organizations when they need to report a cyber incident.298 Outlining these types of specific
controls and contexts within the tailored Canadian framework would create less implementation
ambiguity that may be associated with the generic NIST version, which is still being used in
federal tools as pointed out in the CCRR.
The federal government does not need to provide direct oversight of each individual
sector, but instead can delegate framework oversight responsibilities to regional or sectorspecific organizations who can use the Canadian purpose-built framework to consistently, evenly
and accurately measure security capabilities of owners, operators and vendors—just as the OEB
and IIROC continue to do for their industries. For example, a regulator conducting a sector wide
resiliency review can aggregate maturity scores collected during a framework compliance audit
to determine the level of cyber risk in the sector from an objective perspective, as opposed to
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relying on a wide range of reports from operators that have different control and assessment
criteria. This first tier of the proposed critical infrastructure cybersecurity strategy would create a
high-level framework tool that would provide policy makers, key sector stakeholders and
regulators with more accurate, consistent and tailored information on the current state of cyber
resilience at a given organization, the vendors in a sector and the sector as a whole.

Fostering an Assumption of Compromise (AoC) Culture
As outlined in chapter four, the threat actors interested in targeting Canada’s vital
systems are continuing to increase their technical sophistication at a rapid rate. This is occurring
while new ICT processes and systems, such as IoT, 5G and cloud computing are transforming
how traditional IT environments across Canada’s critical infrastructure are operated. The
combination of these trends and the persistence of vulnerable legacy hardware and software in
both industrial and non-industrial sectors require Canadian owners, operators and vendors to
change their cultural approach to cybersecurity. The second tier of a proposed critical
infrastructure cybersecurity strategy is to foster an Assumption of Compromise (AoC) culture
among all stakeholders across every sector. An AoC approach essentially moves enterprise
security strategy away from the notion that sophisticated threats—such as APTs—can be
prevented from accessing protected networks, meaning cybersecurity programs need to
recognize that breaches or compromises will and are actively occurring.299 An AoC approach not
only places an emphasis on detection and response functions, which includes appropriate tooling
ranging from Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) to insider threat behaviour
software, but it also aims to implement a new foundational approach to security. A key
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component of this culture shift relies on adapting the idea that malicious actors are not just
individuals or groups outside the enterprise’s perimeter defenses trying to break in but are
already active inside the network. These actors are always seeking access to important systems,
conducting reconnaissance, escalating privileges and moving laterally across local and wide area
networks. Cybersecurity then, is no longer responsive but proactive.
A 2016 EY report outlining their Cybersecurity Compromise Diagnostic service
offerings, which provide technical and policy solutions as part of an AoC strategy, highlights
that, “Organizations recognize that stopping sophisticated cyber attackers is unrealistic. It’s no
longer a matter of if or when you will be breached, it has probably already happened. The
quickest way to identify and eject an intruder is to assume that they’re already in your
environment and to proactively assess your systems and networks for evidence of
compromise.”300 As previous chapters have noted, the threat landscape Canada’s critical
infrastructure community must mitigate includes APT groups that conduct prolonged attacks
with TTPs that intentionally implement anti-detection tools to sustain long-term intelligence
operations on their targets. These types of groups were responsible for the damaging attacks on
Ukraine’s power grid, Britain’s NHS and Bangladesh’s central bank in addition to thousands of
other infrastructure compromises with less of a large-scale strategic or physical impact.301
Although Canada’s infrastructure sectors need to ensure their defenses are well
implemented to deter low-cost opportunistic offensive cyber activity, organizations and
regulators need to also ensure that proper human capital, financial and technical resources are
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being directed towards the APT-type actor who may be operating on behalf of a government for
strategic and geopolitical objectives. For example, while Canadian banks have a range of daily
cybersecurity challenges to mitigate, ranging from data privacy breaches to the hacking of online
bank accounts, there must also be initiatives aiming to mitigate the low-probability high-impact
risk of an actor targeting an essential service such as the LVTS.
This approach moves organizations away from a preventative or outward-centric
cybersecurity strategy, as protection tools and policies do not directly address issues such as
zero-day vulnerabilities or the likelihood that state-driven APTs have already or will in the future
find a vector to compromise a targeted network. If organizations dedicate more budget and
human talent towards detection and response functions, the potential damage that a breach can
induce significantly declines.302 For example, stronger detection programs may have allowed
Ukraine’s IT security staff to detect a malicious presence that was actively uploading malware
and arbitrary code to machines connected to corporate and control networks for nearly 180 days.
Even though Canadian infrastructure providers and vendors have heavily invested in improving
their cybersecurity operations, chapter four’s breakdown of the nation-state presence in vital
networks reinforces how detection and response capabilities are likely to yield more of a returnon-investment than funding more external protection capabilities.303 Considering an AoC
approach works on the premise that infiltration has already occurred, a company, regulator or
vendor can spend more of their internal cybersecurity budget and technical staff hours tailoring
controls to make it financially costly and timely for the adversary to locate a vulnerable asset that
provides any type of strategic value. The aim of this inward focus is to change the calculus of the
attacker’s return on investment (ROI).
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In 2015, Ashok Sankar, the Senior Director of Cyber Product Strategy and Management
for Raytheon, state that, “Operating an enterprise under the assumption that your systems will
never be compromised is akin to believing that because you take vitamins every day, eat right
and exercise regularly, you’re not going to buy health insurance until after you’re already ill.”304
He elaborated on this comment by noting that industries, such as the critical infrastructure
community, who are routinely targeted by advance threat actors, need to invest in the
technologies, people and processes that can identify and locate indicators of compromise (IOC)
as soon as possible. In doing so, organizations can seek out assistance from federal agencies—a
process that would be outlined in the Canadian-tailored cybersecurity framework—and initiate
their internal response plans to begin isolating and eradicating the threat and restoring systems
with backups if necessary. Canadian critical infrastructure organizations need to assume that they
are always being targeted by a highly capable attacker who is well funded, patient and dedicated
to a long-term operation aiming to reach mission critical systems. Therefore, to mitigate this risk,
it would be prudent to detect such an event as soon as possible and respond in a timely manner,
which is the overall objective of an AoC strategy.
A March 2018 NSA cybersecurity bulletin offering key mitigation techniques for APT
actors noted that their recommendations were primarily based, “Upon the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework functions to manage cybersecurity risk and to promote a defense-in-depth security
posture.”305 Defense-in-depth architecture is a cybersecurity concept that is closely aligned with
both the NIST framework and an AoC culture, as it calls for redundant defensive measures that
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aim to block threats in addition to finding them and eradicating their activities. Layering
defensive solutions draws on a range of tools and processes, including centralized patching
software, IDS/IPS, network access controls, physical access controls, firewalls, sandboxing
environments for malware analysis, host antivirus software, data encryption and routine backup
schedules. Using these components of a defense-in-depth strategy indirectly outlined in the NIST
framework, combined with an AoC culture where employees, executives and IT security staff are
constantly vigilant and searching for threats already in the network, critical infrastructure
enterprises will create a significantly more robust cybersecurity posture for the country’s vital
services and systems.
Discussing the commercial perspective of AoC approaches, a 2018 article from Krebs On
Security, noted that, “The companies run by leaders and corporate board members with advanced
security maturity are investing in ways to attract and retain more cybersecurity talent, and
arranging those defenders in a posture that assumes the bad guys will get in.”306 Private industry
outside of the critical infrastructure community is responding to the growing sophistication of the
common hacker by ensuring incident response and detection capabilities are equally if not more
capable than perimeter security measures. Not only will Canadian infrastructure owners,
operators, and vendors fall behind the general cybersecurity trends by not shifting to AoC tactics,
but they will also be providing attackers with a strategic advantage. Therefore, it is clear that
leveraging an AoC approach combined with the technical and policy guidelines outlined in a
national cybersecurity framework will ensure the country’s critical systems are prepared to
mitigate the increasingly capable state and non-state threat landscape.
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Improving Cyber Threat Information-Sharing
The 2016 Public Safety Canada report titled “Security and Prosperity in the Digital Age”
notes that, “Most of Canada’s critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Canada will
need to find ways to bring together governments at all levels as well as owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to truly address cyber threats to essential services.”307 While several
chapters have outlined the private sectors prominent role in Canadian critical infrastructure, in
addition to highlighting the complex cross-sector and cross-government interactions that occur
on a daily basis, there still remains communication challenges between private and public
stakeholders when it comes to relaying cyber incidents to the government or passing down threat
data from federal bodies to operators and owners. Addressing these communication and
information-sharing weaknesses is a national security concern, which was reinforced in the
private-public collaboration objectives outlined in Public Safety Canada’s 2018 National Cyber
Security Strategy.308
The Canadian government and its intelligence agencies have a unique capability to
collect, analyze, and disseminate important threat information to owners, operators and vendors
supporting critical infrastructure. The 2012 “Assessing Cyber Threats To Canadian
Infrastructure” report published by CSIS notes that, “Critical infrastructure stakeholders in the
Energy and Utilities, Finance, ICT, and Transportation sectors in Canada have been accustomed
to managing the risks to their facilities at a local level. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged
by stakeholders in these key sectors that there are weaknesses and gaps in their cyber defences
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against current threats.”309 When discussing how government stakeholders can address these
challenges, the report argues that, “A more holistic, finely-tuned partnership approach between
the private sector and the security and intelligence community is warranted to help
stakeholders—as well as local authorities—offset these vulnerabilities, mitigate any potential
damage and pre-plan resilience.”310 While this proposal was outlined in nearly seven years ago,
there have been several impediments to implementing such a seamless information-sharing
program. This has curbed the development of a widely used and trusted threat data exchange
network where public and private infrastructure stakeholders could communicate. However,
several agencies and federal Departments have launched initiatives to address this problem, with
some being successful and others facing additional roadblocks.
In 2012, the “Report of the Auditor General of Canada,” which was delivered to the
national Parliament, noted that, “As CCIRC is not operating around the clock, there is a risk that
there will be a delay in the sharing of critical information linked to newly discovered
vulnerabilities or active cyber events reported to CCIRC after operating hours. A restriction on
operating hours means that CCIRC is not able to monitor the cyber threat environment 24 hours
a day, as was envisioned in its mandate.”311 This was clearly a gap in the country’s cybersecurity
incident response capability, in addition to being a major barrier for establishing real-time
monitoring and information-sharing standards to link private stakeholders with government
agencies. As of 2016, these issues had largely been addressed, with CCIRC operating 24 hours a
day and seven days week, while also expanding and updating its intelligence dissemination
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programs.312 For example, by 2016 the organization had grown its Community Portal, which was
a forum for private and public sector stakeholders to report incidents and gain access to CCIRC’s
world-class malware analysis laboratory and a range of vulnerability assessment tools. CCIRC
also increased private and government participation in the Critical Infrastructure Gateway
project, which is a web-based information-sharing platform that allows critical infrastructure
community members to report incidents, share assessments, notify of cyber alerts all while
retaining highly secured communication protocols to prevent any inappropriate disclosures to the
public.313
Although these advancements indicate that information-sharing programs and processes
were improving for the critical infrastructure community, serious challenges still persisted. For
example, nearly five years after the Auditor General report, Public Safety Canada published its
2017 “Horizontal Evaluation of Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy,” which noted that, “Despite
improvements made, for the most part information-sharing among participating organizations
was done on an ad hoc and selective basis. There was no clear policy as to what should be
shared, with whom and when. It was mostly the individual organizations that decide on their own
terms what to share with others.”314 This lack of coordination and oversight demonstrates that
program development efforts initiated after the 2012 audit review were either not well enforced
or were not implemented with the proper rigor and urgency. Since threat data and informationsharing between government and private critical infrastructure stakeholders is essential for
ensuring high-risk vulnerabilities and advanced attacker TTPs are widely defended against
across sectors, the findings of the 2017 Horizontal Evaluation highlight the need for ongoing
policy reform.
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Another impediment to improved cyber threat-information sharing are the classification
restrictions that prevent certain intelligence at the government level being disseminated to private
sector infrastructure owners and operators who do not maintain active government clearances.
The 2017 Horizontal Evaluation document explains that, “Currently, there is no efficient
mechanism for sharing classified information, particularly in real time.”315 Not only is this an
operational challenge for stopping an active malicious cyber campaign, but it also provides more
evidence of a lack of remediation activities following the recommendations outlined in the 2012
federal audit. A 2018 Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce report
discussing cyber threats to Canadian interests also reaffirmed the classification issues that are
limiting threat information-sharing between public and private entities. The report notes that,
“There is a need for the government and the private sector to coordinate their efforts to rapidly
respond to cyber attacks, which could involve sharing sensitive and confidential information.
However, information sharing can be difficult since government information may be classified
and companies can only share limited or very general information.”316
David Swan, the director of cyber intelligence at the Centre for Strategic Cyberspace and
Security Science in Alberta, reinforced this point during an interview with IT World Canada
where he explained that, “Canadian companies are very conservative on what they let out about
cyber attacks, and that’s a problem because if you don’t share information on who’s attacking
then the bad guys get to run around the neighbourhood and keep doing it.”317 Not only are
government policy limitations creating threat information-sharing barriers, but corporate
competition, IP considerations and a general lack of interest in sending sensitive company data to
315
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government networks are also curbing reform efforts. It is worth noting that in 2017, a
spokeswoman with CSE announced that the agency officially maintained a software zero-day
vulnerability stockpile, where certain vulnerabilities would be released to vendors and the public
while others would be retained for national security purposes.318 Considering the impact of the
WannaCry virus and its roots in an NSA zero-day exploit, there is a significant precedent for
ensuring that CSE and other federal agencies have the administrative procedures and technical
capacity to rapidly distribute patch advice or communicate exploit TTPs that an adversary may
leverage in a future infrastructure attack. However, the current state of the information-sharing
apparatus indicates that this would be a challenge, which only reinforces the need to implement
this policy tier as part of a new national infrastructure cybersecurity plan.
In addition to private-to-private and government-to-private threat sharing limitations,
multiple reports indicate that federal agencies and Departments have internal challenges that are
impacting infrastructure cybersecurity operations. An example of this government-togovernment information-sharing weakness was highlighted in the 2012 federal audit, where the
Office of the Auditor General explained that, “We found that CSE has not been consistently
providing CCIRC with timely and complete information gained from its monitoring of
government systems. We asked officials from the two agencies what kept CSE from sharing this
information. CSE told us it was concerned about sharing information because of the sensitive
nature of the information it collects, such as classification levels or the sensitivities of client
departments.”319 While the report notes that these intergovernmental and interagency issues were
addressed the following year of the audit, the 2017 Horizontal Strategy indicates otherwise. For
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example, the 2017 document states that, “There is a lack of appropriate tools and infrastructure
for sharing classified information. Currently, several classified networks across government lack
interoperability. In addition, only a limited number of employees have access to these
networks.”320 While classification challenges are clear barriers for implementing improved threat
data distribution for regulators, operators and owners to utilize in their local or national
cybersecurity programs, there have also been difficulties in assigning roles and responsibilities.
This has directly impacted the event response quality of past critical infrastructure cyber
incidents, where private stakeholders were unclear about who to contact in the Canadian
government.
The 2017 Horizontal Strategy also discovered that, “Critical infrastructure owners and
operators were particularly unclear about the roles and responsibilities of these two organizations
[CCIRC and CSE].”321 This lack of clarity existed despite of the policy and administrative
remediation activities federal authorities undertook in the years following the 2012 audit. The
report plainly adds in its recommendation section that, “Roles and responsibilities need to be
clearer, particularly those of CSE and the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre.
Specifically, there is a need to clarify which organization should serve as the first point of
contact for the private sector in the event of a cyber-incident.”322 While further remediation
efforts on this issue have been launched since 2017, over a year later the 2018 cyber threat report
from the Senate warned that, “There is a clear need for public/private coordination in responding
to attacks against critical infrastructure and a single clear point of contact in the public sector for
chief information security officers in the private sector. These improvements will help us better
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share information in a protected fashion and will help us manage and prevent future attacks.”323
These ongoing roles and responsibility challenges across the critical infrastructure environment
and the confusion among sector stakeholders regarding public-private and government-togovernment information-sharing procedures reinforces the need to create new incentives,
structures and exercises to improve communication.
While the government is launching new initiatives to improve the Critical Infrastructure
Gateway project and to reduce classification barriers, CSE and CCIRC along with private sector
operators and vendors should increase their interaction with the Canadian Cyber Threat
Exchange (CCTX).324 This independent, not-for-profit organization has a rapidly growing
membership—including critical infrastructure stakeholders and ordinary corporate entities—
interested in leveraging their threat information, cyber analysis and risk mitigation services. Not
only does CCTX gather threat data from its members, but it also correlates and analyzes this data
to create actionable cyber threat intelligence that directly feeds into member cybersecurity
programs and dashboards.325 Working with non-governmental partners, such as CCTX, is a costeffective and quick solution for increasing the country’s threat information-sharing capacity.
However, as previously noted, these types of public-private partnerships will only reach their full
potential if classification, administrative and protocol communication barriers are resolved first.
Implementing the three strategy tiers recommended in this chapter would significantly
increase the cyber resilience of the country’s critical infrastructure. The framework would
provide a high-level guidance tool for all industrial and non-industrial sector stakeholders to
build-out their cybersecurity programs in addition to providing regulators with a reliable,
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consistent and thorough auditing tool. Further, by combing the technical and policy controls
outlined in a national framework with the organizational culture shift to AoC, foreign and
domestic threat actors—even the most sophisticated APT groups—would have a difficult time
overcoming cybersecurity programs purpose-built for detection, eradication and response. Lastly,
leveraging the advanced intelligence, computer engineering and cybersecurity analysis
capabilities of Canada’s security community, namely the CSE, CSIS and CCIRC, to provide
real-time threat feeds directly into the security architecture of critical infrastructure enterprises
will ensure that Canada remains well prepared to defend the nation’s essential services from
strategic attacks and incidents in cyberspace.

Areas of Future Research
Three primary areas of research that are important to add to the discussion of protecting
Canada’s critical infrastructure from cyber threats relate to retaliation policy, attribution of
attacks and international legal models for managing offensive cyber activities. First, it is
important to recognize that the policies surrounding how Canada would retaliate to an attack and
with what means that retaliation would leverage remains unclear. This is an area of research that
is essential for future critical infrastructure protection as these policies can communicate
consequences to adversaries that may deter their computer network exploitation and attack
activities. Part of this research would need to expand the defensive orientated framework
approach provided in this chapter to also include an offensively orientated framework for
whether Canada would leverage digital or physical means to target an attacker and under what
circumstances escalation would occur. Additionally, further outlining the relationship between
civilian signals and cybersecurity agencies, such as CSE, and their offensive cyber partners
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embedded across the CAF would strengthen the understanding of offensive authorities in Canada
and who would be responsible for carrying out an attack.
The topic of escalation and retaliation becomes complicated when assessing the possible
response options for different types of threat actors. For example, it is difficult to determine
which authorities should respond to a cyber attack that caused significant physical or financial
damage when the actor is an international terrorist group leveraging digital infrastructure across
multiple countries. Under these circumstances, it could be politically and legally challenging for
the government of Canada to conduct any activity as the targeted IT systems could belong to the
hosting government or international companies who were not necessarily the perpetrator of the
attack. Research is needed to clarify how these issues would be resolved and what legal
requirements would need to be settled to ensure a retaliation could occur promptly against
foreign and domestic threats.
An additional area of future research that should be examined includes the requirements
and prospect of establishing international norms and legal models for offensive activities in
cyberspace. Part of this research area needs to address attribution challenges from a technical and
policy standpoint. On the technical side, it would be beneficial to create identification thresholds
and burden-of-proof standards for claiming a certain actor, group, or government was
responsible for an operation. For example, Canada’s national security would benefit if there were
predetermined guidelines for assessing when an attack or infiltration attempt could be attributed
to a government when the actor directly responsible was a private group who received certain
assistance from official state institutions—though the affiliation or involvement of these
institutions is difficult to precisely establish. As highlighted in chapter four, many different APT
groups and private threat actors have close relationships with governments but are not always
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ordered, controlled or augmented by official employees, leaders or military authorities.
Understanding how to manage these types of attribution issues should be an essential component
of future analysis associated with responding to and deterring cyber attacks on Canadian critical
infrastructure.
Lastly, an important aspect of future research that should be undertaken relates to the
challenges associated with government based computer network defense and its operational
integration with the majority of Canada’s privately owned and controlled critical infrastructure
IT networks. Since this was not a technical issue specifically analyzed in this thesis, future
discussions on critical infrastructure cybersecurity across the country should review the costs,
legal challenges and resource requirements for leveraging real-time CAF and CSE attack
prevention within the IT systems for the thousands of private sector stakeholders supporting
essential services. This research would directly support and add new context to the third policy
recommendation provided in this chapter, which relates to cyber threat information-sharing, as it
would take the recommendation one step further by allowing hands-on government network
intervention on privately owned systems. Additional analysis would need to occur to understand
the feasibility of private industry allowing this type of remote interactive government access to
important proprietary digital assets often housing or overseeing intellectual property and
proprietary technology.
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CONCLUSION

Failures within the provision of essential services provided by private industry or public
entities can result in major safety risks and financial loss for Canadians and Canadian businesses.
Historically, events or actors that were capable of inducing this type of failure were associated
with physical disturbances, such as environmental disasters or equipment malfunctions and even
acts of material terrorism. While these threats are still ongoing challenges for ensuring the
integrity and availability of critical infrastructure, new risks in cyberspace have rapidly
transformed the requirements for securing vital assets and achieving a high level of resiliency
across national systems. Federal government initiatives and policy reform, particularly from
organizations such as Public Safety Canada and CSE, have aimed to meet these evolving
requirements but this has been paralleled by an increasingly dedicated and technically proficient
threat landscape. Consequently, significant cyber risks still persist across the country’s critical
industrial and non-industrial infrastructures, posing an active national security challenge for the
government and an operational issue for sector stakeholders.
As this thesis has outlined, the breadth and complexity of critical infrastructure sectors
makes oversight and enforcement of cybersecurity policies a challenging objective. This is in
addition to the highly technical issues that were identified in ICS and SCADA systems
throughout the industrial environment and the unique IT security challenges facing stakeholders
in the non-industrial environment, such as banks servicing the national FMI. Combining these
policy and technical challenges reinforces the idea that cybersecurity for critical infrastructure
must be a collaborative effort, where there is strong public-private coordination and recognition
of the unique threat environment that is actively seeking to compromise key assets. This
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environment includes nation-state governments with significant technical, financial and
personnel resources, and their sophisticated affiliates such as Iran’s APT33 or China’s APT10
hacking groups. The thesis also detailed how less advanced but increasingly resourceful nonstate actors are beginning to become direct threats, such as international terrorist groups who are
not only trying to develop indigenous capabilities but are looking to ideologically recruit
computer security experts or pay them for hacking-as-a-service. Further, as highlighted during
the assessment of insider threats, the growing digital connections throughout critical
infrastructure are opening up new avenues for malicious and negligent employees, contractors
and business partners to conduct attacks directly or enable others to do so.
The key vulnerabilities that were identified for industrial infrastructure sectors largely
stemmed from the convergence of corporate and control networks, where the linkage of control
technologies with Internet-facing systems has introduced new strategic risks for Canada. Some
of the country’s most fundamental systems, such as electricity, water distribution and natural gas
delivery, can be disrupted, disabled and even destroyed by well-crafted and executed malicious
cyber operations. This was highlighted in the examples of the Ukrainian power grid attack and
Stuxnet’s impact on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, in addition to smaller less impactful incidents
such as the North Korean hack against Metrolinx. As stakeholders in the control environment
continue to integrate legacy IT systems with emerging technologies such as cloud computing,
SDN and IoT devices, the attack surface will increase and advanced threat actors will have more
opportunities to position themselves within networks servicing Canadians, businesses and
government offices on a daily basis.
The thesis also explained the unique risks in the non-industrial environment using the
FMI as a case study. While the example demonstrated the direct risks to the national economy
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specifically, such as patch management issues and software vulnerabilities associated with the
LVTS or SWIFT network, it also referenced more general challenges such as the rising prospect
of extremely large DDoS attacks. The strategic consequences of major incidents in the nonindustrial environment were highlighted in the WannaCry ransomware virus example, which
analyzed the technical cybersecurity failures that crippled key British healthcare organizations
and their operations for several days in 2017—including some medical emergency providers.
Subsequent chapters discussed how legacy IT systems in these non-industrial environments are
now integrating with emerging technologies such as 5G networks to create new national security
policy issues for Canadian infrastructure stakeholders, such foreign adversaries leveraging their
position in the hardware and software supply chain to maliciously alter components of important
IT assets before deployment in Canadian networks.
To address the increasingly complicated threat landscape targeting critical infrastructure
and the rapidly growing number of vulnerabilities across legacy and emerging IT systems in
industrial and non-industrial sectors, this thesis constructed and recommended a three-tiered
national infrastructure cybersecurity strategy. This approach suggests that federal authorities
leverage a tailored NIST assessment framework unique to the Canadian legal, regulatory,
political and threat landscape; incentivize and implement an AoC culture among all sector
stakeholders to improve detection and response capabilities as opposed to focusing on external
protection priorities; and lastly, increase cyber threat-information sharing to promote peer-topeer and government-to-industry threat intelligence and data exchanges. This strategy drew
support and evidence from the recommendations and findings of publications outlined in
Canadian sources such as Public Safety Canada, CSIS, CSE, and from U.S. sources such as the
DHS, FBI, NIST and the NSA.
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As Ottawa and its foreign partners continue to commit more resources to leverage
cyberspace as a tool for geopolitical competition, Canada’s competitors and adversaries—state
and non-state alike—will continue to do the same. These trends indicate that the strategic and
commercial importance of the cyber domain is rising just as new technologies and associated
vulnerabilities are being introduced into the nation’s critical infrastructure. Ensuring that private
industry and public infrastructure stakeholders can defend against a range of threat actors 365
days a year and 24 hours a day will continue to grow as a key requirement for supporting the
country’s national security. If this challenge cannot be adequately addressed with the assistance
of technical and policy-based cybersecurity reform, Canada will face a systemic security risk that
may hinder the economic and safety interests of the country moving into the future.
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